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THE NONDISCHARGEABILITY OF DIVORCE-BASED
DEBTS IN BANKRUPTCY: A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
TO THE HARDENED HEART
Veryl Victoria Miles*
I. INTRODUCTION
[Miarriage should be regarded as indissoluble in itself; for the
end of marriage is the ethical end, which is so exalted that
everything else appears powerless against it and subject to its
authority... But it is indissoluble only in itself, for as Christ
says, divorce is permitted only 'because of the hardness of
their hearts.' Since marriage contains the moment of feeling
... it is not absolute but unstable, and it has within it the
possibility of dissolution .... [Llegislat[ors] must make such
dissolution as difficult as possible and uphold the right of
ethics against caprice.'
The preceding quotation is a striking expression of the primacy
and importance of marriage and family to the wholeness of a society.
Given the import of marriage and family to society, its dissolution
through divorce must be regulated with the greatest care. Although
those sentiments were expressed more than 175 years ago by
German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel, they provide a powerful and
sobering reminder of the commonplace occurrence of divorce today,
its contribution to the rapid demise of the family, and the critical
need for society to fight for its preservation.2 Today, as in the past,
* Associate Professor, The Catholic University of America, School of Law. The author would
like to thank Professor Peter C. Alexander for his comments, and express her thanks and ap-
preciation to Ms. Tyra Wright, Mr. Adam Paul and Ms. Jennifer Hayes, Esq., for their research
assistance.
I G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 203 (Allen W. Wood ed. & H.B.
Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (citation omitted).
2 The long-term effect of divorce decisions is overwhelming. See Michael J. Albano,
Children-The Innocent Victims of Family Breakups: How the Family Law Attorney, the Courts,
and Society Can Protect Our Children, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 787, 787 (1995). Both the parties
divorcing and the court system are stressed by the break up of a family. See id. The
emotional, physical and economic consequences of divorce require that the family law attorney
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the family remains an essential base upon which a stable society is
built and finds a secure foundation. It is within the family that an
individual should experience the beginnings of moral, ethical and
educational life. In turn, parents must possess adequate financial
resources to meet this responsibility to their children.
While our laws governing divorce have become quite liberal, such
that obtaining a divorce is relatively easy and not at all limited to
grave or irreconcilable estrangement between spouses, recent
reformation in many of our laws-both criminal and civil in
nature-seek to preserve and enforce an individual's financial
responsibility to children and former spouses after a divorce.4 In
fact, this movement found a receptive ally in 1994 when Congress
work with social workers, psychologists, counselors and others to resolve a myriad of problems
in the wake of a divorce. See id. Both the nature of divorce and the volume of divorce cases
are alarming. See id. In fact, national divorce statistics show a grim trend:
In 1895, only 0.4% of individuals over the age of fourteen were divorced. By the end of
World War II, the number had tripled, but was still only 1.2%. In 1987, 1,166,000 people
were divorced, with an average age of thirty-five years for men and thirty-three years for
women. Since 1944, the percentage of divorce has drastically increased to the fifty
percent range. In 1990, 2.4 million weddings were performed while, during the same
year, 1.2 million divorces were filed.
Id. at 788 (citations omitted).
' In the 1970s, most states adopted no-fault divorce laws, making divorce easier than it ever
had been in the past. See Martin Zelder, The Economic Analysis of the Effect of No-Fault
Divorce Law on the Divorce Rate, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 241, 241 (1993). Many expected
those laws to lead to an increase in the divorce rate. See id. at 242. Today, every state has
a no-fault divorce law. See id. at 242 n.1. Professor Zelder predicts that one of the
consequences of widespread no-fault divorce laws is a continued increase in the divorce rate.
See id. at 242. However, he argues that the reason that divorce rates increased in the 1970s
and 1980s, and will continue to rise, is not that divorce became easier, but because of greater
spending by parents on "children relative to other 'goods' within marriage." Id.
4 Forcing people to meet their familial obligations after divorce increasingly has captured
the attention of state and federal lawmakers. In 1984 Congress passed the Child Support
Enforcement Amendments which required states to adopt statewide advisory child support
guidelines. See Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.); Linda Henry Elrod, The Federalization of Child Support Guidelines, 6 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAw. 103, 104 (1990). However, statutes such as the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act and the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,
which allow interstate enforcement of child support in civil actions, often result in "slow and
nonproductive" procedures due to the lack of uniformity between state laws, the risks as-
sociated with modification of existing support awards, case backlogs, and the relatively low
priority of child support cases when compared with other cases. See id. at 105-08. Another
commentator predicts that concerns about alimony may result in national alimony legislation.
See Robert G. Spector, The Nationalization of Family Law: An Introduction to the Manual for
the Coming Age, 27 FAM. L.Q. 1, 4 (1993) (explaining that some aspects of alimony enforcement
are governed by the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act).
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passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 (Reform Act).5 The
Reform Act is a comprehensive set of amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code (Code)6 that includes several provisions designed to prevent
bankruptcy relief from being used as a means of escaping alimony,
child support, and other divorce-based financial obligations assessed
against an individual under a divorce or separation decree. Its goal
is to provide adequate support for children and a former spouse, or
to provide a fair financial settlement of the marital assets between
the divorced parties.7
It has. been, and continues to be, a long standing rule of
bankruptcy law that an individual cannot escape personal liability
for alimony or child support by filing a petition in bankruptcy.8 In
describing the policy issues regarding the nondischargeability of
alimony and child support obligations at bankruptcy, one commen-
tator succinctly noted that while the "[riehabilitation of helpless
debtors is an important objective [of bankruptcy relief] ... there is
no compelling reason why this should be at the expense of the
economically helpless members of his, or her family."9 Thus, under
section 523(a)(5) of the Code, alimony and child support obligations
are deemed nondischargeable at bankruptcy. °
Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C.) [hereinafter Reform Act].
6 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
' The amendments to the Bankruptcy Code [hereinafter Code] providing greater support and
enforcement of familial obligations were listed under section 304 of the Reform Act, entitled
"Protection of Child Support and Alimony." See id. In the House Report accompanying the
legislation this group of amendments was explained as follows:
This section is intended to provide greater protection for alimony, maintenance, and
support obligations owing to a spouse, former spouse or child of a debtor in bankruptcy.
The Committee believes that a debtor should not use the protection of a bankruptcy filing
in order to avoid legitimate marital and child support obligations.
H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 54 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3363.
Some of the amendments designed to preserve and protect alimony and child support
payments included an exception of paternity actions or legal proceedings to obtain or modify
alimony or child support payment from the protection of the automatic stay under section
362(b); the inclusion of alimony and child support as priority claims under section 507(a); a
prohibition for avoidance of pre-bankruptcy judicial liens that secure alimony or child support
obligations of a debtor for the benefit of a former spouse or child under section 522(f); and
protection of alimony and child support payments from avoidance as preferential transfers
under section 547 of the Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(2)(A), 507(a)(7), 522(f)(1)(A), 547(c)(7).
8 Section 523(a)(5) of the Code provides that debts owed "to a spouse, former spouse, or child
of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection
with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record" are
nondischargeable. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).
9 2 DANIEL R. CowANS, COWANS BANKRuPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.49 (6th ed. 1994).
'0 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).
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However, prior to the enactment of the Reform Act, an individual
could avoid liability for nonsupport property settlement obligations
incurred under a divorce decree by seeking relief in bankruptcy. If
the bankruptcy court determined that a debt did not constitute
alimony or support under section 523(a)(5) but was instead a
property settlement, the debtor would be discharged from personal
liability for the debt." The dischargeability of property settlements
encouraged many to view bankruptcy as an opportunity to find relief
from this obligation.
In many cases, divorce or separation agreements were drafted in
a manner that described the obligation assumed by the financially
stronger party as a property settlement instead of alimony or
support. It soon became clear that section 523(a)(5), alone, was not
sufficient to make support and maintenance obligations nondis-
chargeable where the divorce decrees had labeled such obligations as
settlements. 12 As noted by one court:
[T]he reality of modern divorce judgments and property set-
tlement agreements is that the characterization of obligations
they create is, as often as not, the product of factors not
always taken into account in § 523(a)(5) dischargeability
determinations. For example, how much child support or
'1 "The legislative history of the Code makes it clear that what constitutes alimony,
maintenance, and support will be determined by the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code rather
than by the labels or characterization given by state statutes or state courts." 2 COWANS,
supra note 9, § 6.49 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 363 (1977)). See also 2 DAVID G. EPSTEIN,
ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 7-29, at 371 & n.1 (1992). Likewise, several federal circuits recognize
that bankruptcy law rather than state law determines whether a particular obligation
constitutes alimony, maintenance, or support under section 523(a)(5). See Swate v. Hartwell,
99 F.3d 1282, 1286 (5th Cir. 1996); Brody v. Brody, 3 F.3d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1993); Harrell v.
Harrell, 754 F.2d 902, 904 (11th Cir. 1985). In Harrell, the court held that the language of
section 523(a)(5) does not allow state courts to determine dischargeability. See id. "Congress
chose instead to describe as not dischargeable those obligations in the 'nature' of support. We
believe that in using this general and abstract word, Congress did not intend bankruptcy
courts to be bound by particular state law rules." Id.
12 See Campbell v. Campbell (In re Campbell), 198 B.R. 467, 471 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996).
Despite the rulings of the family courts or their pre-bankruptcy agreements, parties
were in a position to effectively re-litigate a substantial number of the issues surrounding
the divorce as part of the dischargeability determination to be made pursuant to [section]
523(a)(5).
"Many scholars urged reform in the Bankruptcy Code because of the injustice caused
by the support/property division and to spare bankruptcy judges from the sophistry of
reconciling the irreconcilable."
Id. (quoting Collins v. Hesson (In re Hesson), 190 B.R. 229, 234 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995)). See also
Dressler v. Dressler (In re Dressler), 194 B.R. 290, 299-300 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1996) (discussing the
inadequacy of section 523(a)(5) in striking "a fair balance between a divorced debtor's discharge
and the needs of that debtor's former spouse or family").
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alimony one party receives may be a function of the extent
and timing of property division payments. One party may
bargain to have an obligation (or payment) labeled one way
or the other for tax purposes in return for some offsetting
concession. Or the parties might sign off on a form
agreement without a second thought to the way it charac-
terizes reciprocal rights and obligations. Divorcing couples
are generally concerned with the economic consequences of
divorce, rather than the labels that attach to the arrange-
ment's components. For another, Congress perceived that
divorce "obligors were able to craftily draft settlement
agreements to be in property, rather than in alimony terms
and then discharge their marital obligations in
bankruptcy."13
In response to a growing concern that too many divorce-based
property settlements and hold harmless agreements were being
discharged in bankruptcy to the detriment of needy nondebtor ex-
spouses and their dependents, the Reform Act added section
523(a)(15) to the list of nondischargeable debts enumerated under
the Code.14 Section 523(a)(15) makes divorce-based debts that are
13 Dressier, 194 B.R. at 299-300 (citations omitted).
14 Several commentators called for an amendment of the Code to prevent property
settlements from being discharged. Professor Jana Singer reasoned that the "Code's distinction
between nondischargeable support awards and dischargeable property distributions [had]
become untenable .... because property division ... replaced support as the preferred means
of adjusting the spouses' financial relationship." Jana B. Singer, Divorce Obligations and
Bankruptcy Discharge: Rethinking the Support /Property Distinction, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 43,
45 (1993). According to Professor Singer, the discharge of divorce-based property obligations
"compromises the certainty and finality of divorce settlements and undermines the partnership
notions that lie at the heart of equitable distribution schemes"; and since the majority of
debtors seeking discharge of divorce-based debts are ex-husbands, the discharge of property
settlements contributes "to the already disparate economic effect of divorce on women." Id. at
46. Similarly, it was this disparate treatment of women under section 523(a)(5), "an ostensibly
gender-neutral statute," that prompted Professor Peter Alexander to assess the problem with
the alimony/property settlement distinction required under section 523(a)(5) from a feminist
legal theory perspective. See Peter C. Alexander, Divorce and the Dischargeability of Debts:
Focusing on Women as Creditors in Bankruptcy, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 351, 352 (1994). It is his
opinion that the bankruptcy court should not be required to determine whether a debt is in the
nature of support or a property settlement, but simply address the matter of the discharge-
ability of the obligation. That is, "[a] more appropriate version of section 523(a)(5) would
require the bankruptcy court to refuse to discharge any debt to a spouse, ex-spouse, or child
of the debtor, which was reduced to judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction and which
arose out of a separation or divorce or out of an action for alimony or support." Id. at 393. See
also Sheryl .L. Scheile, Bankruptcy and the Modification of Support: Fresh Start, Head Start,
or False Start?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 577, 637-38 (1991) (advocating that federal courts "adopt a
broader view of the exception from discharge" than stated in the plain language of section
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not in the nature of alimony and support, as defined under section
523(a)(5), and that are incurred by the debtor under a divorce or
separation decree or other court order of record nondischargeable
unless:
(A) the debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt from
income or property of the debtor not reasonably necessary to
be expended for the maintenance or support of the debtor or
a dependent of the debtor and, if the debtor is engaged in a
business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for the
continuation, preservation, and operation of such business; or
(B) discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the
debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to a
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor. 5
The goal of this provision is to eliminate a "devastating" loophole
often used by noncustodial parents seeking bankruptcy relief to avoid
personal liability for property settlements and hold harmless
obligations incurred under a divorce or separation agreement.
16
In an impassioned appeal to Congress in support of this provision,
Congresswoman Slaughter stated:
During a divorce agreement, it is not uncommon for the
custodial parent to accept a lower level of child support in
exchange for the other parent assuming the couple's marital
debts. If the non-custodial parent declares bankruptcy,
however, the marital debts than [sic] fall to the single parent.
Think of what the custodial parent then faces: little or no
child support payments, the heavy responsibilities of all the
marital debts, and the expenses that come with rearing
children alone.
523(a)(5) because modern divorce laws recognize forms of alimony that resemble property
division in form and, thus, are misappopriately discharged). The author suggests that
"[blecause of the inextricable interrelationship between support and property division, the ideal
solution is for Congress to eliminate the distinction from the Bankruptcy Code entirely." Id.;
Ottilie Bello, Comment, Bankruptcy and Divorce: The Courts Send a Message to Congress, 13
PACE L. REV. 643, 716-19 (1993) (stating that section 523(a)(5) "no longer ameliorates the
problem it was designed to address").
,5 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(A)-(B).
16 See H.R. REP. NO. 103-835, at 54 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3363;
Chalkley v. Carroll (In re Chalkley), 53 F.3d 337 (9th Cir. 1995) (decision without published
opinion); Cleveland v. Cleveland (In re Cleveland), 198 B.R. 394, 397 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996)
("Generally speaking, this section has one effect-to make all divorce-related obligations
subject to a presumption of nondischargeability."); Robinson v. Robinson (In re Robinson), 193
B.R. 367, 371-72 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996).
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The Bankruptcy Reform Act would obligate the non-
custodial spouse, who agreed to pay the couple's martial
debts, to continue responsibility for these debts. I think it is
outrageous that wives and dependent children must answer
to creditors for debts the husband first agreed to pay. This
relatively small-but vital-change in the Bankruptcy Code
would prevent this situation, and ensure a more equitable
treatment of all parties in the event of bankruptcy.
Mr. Speaker, I have heard heartbreaking stories from
single parents who want nothing but the best for their
children, but find themselves forced to fight for their rightful
level of child support. With no other recourse, these families
often turn to welfare to provide-the child support the absent
parent ought to be responsible for.'7
Since section 523(a)(15) became law, numerous courts have
interpreted this provision. The response of the bankruptcy judiciary
has been noteworthy in two respects. First, having to revisit the
nature of marital obligations long-settled by state courts has been an
unremovable thorn for bankruptcy courts and uniformly regarded
with skepticism as to the efficacy with which bankruptcy courts can
fairly resolve such matters. As one court lamented:
While the problem which 523(a)(15) was designed to address,
i.e. high to moderate income debtors discharging property
settlements which their former spouses are entitled to and in
most cases desperately need, will be solved by this provision,
the ability of former spouses to continue to wage legal war
against each other in every bankruptcy proceeding will be a
significant burden on all those involved. Too often this Court
has seen impoverished parties in domestic/relation
bankruptcy cases fight over the dischargeability of debts
neither party can afford to pay as an outgrowth of the
bitterness of their state court litigation.
Unfortunately, § 523(a)(15) will give many such couples an
additional avenue to continue their destructive fighting. This
new domestic relations battlefield has the potential to make
the already painful road of bankruptcy and divorce even more
destructive than it is at the present time. Only time and
caselaw will show whether the cost of this additional bitter
litigation will be worth the benefit of preventing easy
" 140 CONG. REC. H10,773 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep. Slaughter).
1997] 1177
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discharges of property based marital obligations under the
Bankruptcy Code. 18
While one can easily sympathize with the bankruptcy judiciary's
distaste for having to re-enter the "domestic relations battleground,"
it will remain an inevitable task as long as divorce and bankruptcy
exist.
The second concern expressed by the courts involves the
draftsmanship of the provision. It is, however, a more solvable issue.
While most courts acknowledge Congress' good intentions in adding
this provision to the Code, the language of section 523(a)(15) has not
earned any praise and has caused great frustration when applying
and interpreting the provision. The courts have criticized section
523(a)(15) for being ambiguous, imprecise and cumbersome,
prompting several courts to call for legislative revision and
clarification. 9 However, given the fact that section 523(a)(15) is
law, albeit one that the bankruptcy courts would prefer not to
address, it is a very important addition to the reform movement
which strengthens and creates new and more effective ways of
preserving and enforcing "legitimate marital and child support
obligations."2' Accordingly, the focus of this Article is how this
statute can be best understood, applied, and clarified in order to
achieve its legislative purpose.
18 In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102, 112 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996) (citation omitted); see also
Silvers v. Silvers (In re Silvers), 187 B.R. 648, 648 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) ("The problem with
that section is that it requires bankruptcy courts to revisit, in excruciating detail, the anger,
the bitterness, and the pain which the Debtor and the Debtor's former spouse have felt and
now feel .... [Olne could almost see the old wounds being reopened and new and more
expensive scars being inflicted upon both parties.").
It has been said that one should never watch laws or sausage being made, and section
523(a)(15) of the Bankruptcy Code is no exception to that caution. Section (a)(15) is a
pernicious creature. Using it is equivalent to applying acupuncture without a license
because it does not heal the emotional wounds from a divorce. Indeed, section (a)(15) is
an intrusive invasion into the private lives of a former couple who had agreed in their
divorce to separate forever. Section (a)(15) can be described as an impediment to the
emotional fresh start in life that divorce may bring. It also can impede the fresh start of
bankruptcy.
Kessler v. Butler (In re Butler), 186 B.R. 371, 372 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995).
19 See Dressler v. Dressler (In re Dressler), 194 B.R. 290, 305 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1996) (noting
the statute's ambiguity and imprecision); Gantz v. Gantz (In re Gantz), 192 B.R. 932, 937
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding that "Section 523(a)(15) has provided a formidable challenge
to the interpretive skills of bankruptcy practitioners and judges"); Smither, 194 B.R. at 106
(calling the statute "cumbersome"); Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 191 B.R. 760, 766 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill.), affd, 199 B.R. 37 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Butler, 186 B.R. at 373 ("The use of triple
negatives in this subsection has turned an otherwise well intended statute into sausage.").
20 H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 54, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3363.
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II. GOOD INTENTIONS AND AN INTERPRETIVE QUAGMIRE: THE
STORY OF SECTION 523(A)(15)
As previously noted, section 523(a)(15) was added to the list of
nondischargeable debts to prevent individuals from using bankruptcy
as a means of escaping liability for all divorce-based debts that are
not alimony or for support and maintenance.21 Although most
would agree with the purpose behind this legislation, few believe the
provision is clear. Considerable consternation arises when the
provision is interpreted and applied.
A. Congressional Intent and the Legislative History
Although the legislative history of section 523(a)(15) is very
limited, it clearly describes the kinds of debts it intends to cover:
hold harmless agreements that a divorcing spouse may assume
under the divorce or separation agreement for obligations the parties
incurred during the marriage; or large property settlement
agreements offered in exchange for lower alimony/support
payments. 22 As noted in the legislative history, when these types
of agreements are assumed in a divorce or separation, often "[tihe
nondebtor spouse may be saddled with substantial debt and little or
no alimony or support."23 Accordingly, in such instances where the
divorce-based obligation is framed in the nature of a property
settlement or hold harmless agreement and is critical to a former
spouse's ability to support himself and his dependents, the preser-
vation of this obligation under the Code is very important.
Under section 523(a)(15), the debtor's general need for relief from
prepetition indebtedness is balanced against the needs of the
nondebtor ex-spouse and their dependents to have this obligation
satisfied.24 This objective reflects two of the fundamental tenants
of bankruptcy law and is addressed through the directive that the
determination of nondischargeability is rebuttable under this
provision through a balancing test.25  That is, conditions for
21 See id.; Butler, 186 B.R. at 372-73 (noting that the statute was designed to stop parties
from "discharg[ing] their marital obligations in bankruptcy").
22 See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 54, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3363.
23 Id.
24 See id.
25 The ability to rebut the nondischargeability of divorce-based property settlements under
section 523(a)(15) is not similarly possible with respect to alimony and child support
obligations under section 523(a)(5)-these debts are absolutely nondischargeable. See 4
19971 1179
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nondischargeability are limited to "cases where the debtor has the
ability to pay them and the detriment to the nondebtor spouse from
their nonpayment outweighs the benefit to the debtor of discharging
such debts."26
Accordingly, if the qualifying debt is one that the debtor will not
be able to pay and still have sufficient income for the reasonable
support of the debtor, his or her dependents and business, the debt
may be discharged. In cases where the debtor is able to pay the
debt, the debt may be deemed dischargeable on the grounds that the
benefits of a discharge to the debtor outweigh any detriment the
nondebtor spouse and his or her dependents would suffer from
nonpayment of the debt. The legislative history explains that these
two alternative conditions for permitting a discharge of a divorce-
based debt reflect Congressional concern "that payment of support
needs must take precedence over property settlement debts" and that
in cases where the debtor has the ability to pay the debt, "[t]he
benefits of the debtor's discharge should be sacrificed only if there
would be substantial detriment to the nondebtor spouse that
outweighs the debtor's need for a fresh start."
27
As further explained in the legislative history, a qualifying debt
must be one "incurred in a divorce or separation that [is] owed to a
spouse or former spouse" and its nondischargeability can be raised
"only by the other party to the divorce or separation."28 This
requirement is critical in cases where the debt in question is a hold
harmless agreement arising from a marital debt the debtor and
spouse, or former spouse, had jointly owed to a third party. With
this type of debt, the spouse or former spouse to whom the debt is
owed is the only party with standing to seek a determination of
nondischargeability under section 523(a)(15). 29  It is the debtor's
hold harmless agreement to the spouse, or former spouse, that is the
subject of nondischargeability under section 523(a)(15).30 The third
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 523.11 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996) (discussing exemption
from discharge under section 523(a)(5)).
26 H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 54, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3363.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 55, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3364.
29 See id.
20 See id. at 54, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3363. In In re Finaly, the nondebtor
spouse filed a motion for a hearing on the nondischargeability of a debt that the debtor owed
to a third party and had agreed to hold the nondebtor spouse harmless. See Barstow v. Finaly
(In re Finaly), 190 B.R. 312, 313-14 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995). The court held that the exception
to discharge under section 523(a)(15) was not applicable to obligations a debtor owed to a third
party and applies only to the debt the debtor owed to the former spouse arising from the
[Vol. 601180
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party to whom the marital debt is owed does not have standing
under this provision and the debt owed to the third party is not the
subject of nondischargeability under section 523(a)(15).8'
divorce decree. See id. at 315. Additionally, in In re Stegall, an ex-wife petitioned the
bankruptcy court to find the debtor's obligation to assume a pre-marital debt owed to a bank
nondischargeable under section 523(a)(15). See Stegall v. Stegall (In re Stegall) 188 B.R. 597,
597 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995). The court interpreted section 523(a)(15) to be in reference to
debts one "'incurred' in the course of a divorce or separation." Id. at 598. The debtor's
obligation to assume payments for a debt he was already liable for, as one incurred in the
divorce, the property settlement did not change the debtor's liability for the debt. See id.
Although, "[i]f... the [divorce] agreement had provided that debtor would indemnify and hold
plaintiff harmless to the extent she made payments to [the bank], a new obligation might have
been incurred." Id. Thus, "to the extent plaintiff actually made such payments, section
523(a)(15) might have come into play." Id. But see Schmitt v. Eubanks (In re Schmitt), 197
B.R. 312, 316 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996); Johnston v. Henson (In re Henson), 197 B.R. 299, 303
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1996) (disagreeing with the requirement announced in Stegall that the
divorce decree include hold harmless language in order for the debt to fall within the scope of
section 523(a)(15)). These courts held that under state law a decree with language importing
an obligation on the part of the debtor to pay a marital debt and giving the nondebtor a right
to indemnification is sufficient to qualify as a divorce-based debt for purposes of section
523(a)(15) in the absence of "hold harmless" language. See Schmitt, 197 B.R. at 316; Henson,
197 B.R. at 303. See also McCracken v. LaRue (In re LaRue), 204 B.R. 531, 535-36 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1997) (stating that because the final divorce decree between the debtor and plaintiff
did not contain a "hold harmless" agreement obligating the debtor to reimburse the plaintiff
for debts in question, the court held that the debts were not incurred by the debtor in
connection with the divorce decree and did not fall within the scope of a nondischargeable debt
under section 523(a)(15)).
31 See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 55, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3364. See also
Abate v. Beach (In re Beach), 203 B.R. 676, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that the
debtor's attorney did not have standing to seek a determination of nondischargeability under
section 523(a)(15), and finding that Congress only intended this provision to make debts
incurred by a debtor under a divorce decree owed, to a spouse and former spouse nondischarge-
able). The court offered an illustration in support of its position on the debtor's attorney's
standing in the following observation:
Interestingly, the language of Section 523(a)(15)(B) requires the debtor to prove that the
benefit of the discharge outweighs the detriment to the former spouse. Nowhere does it
mention a third party. A third party, if permitted to bring a Section 523(a)(15) action,
always would be faced with the insurmountable obstacle of Section 523(a)(15)(B). If a third
party brought a complaint under Section 523(a)(15) seeking to discharge a debt in which the
former spouse has no liability, the debtor would always raise the affirmative defense set
forth in Section 523(a)(15)(B). The debtor would succeed because the former spouse suffers
no detrimental consequences when the debt is discharged. Under this plain reading of
Section 523(a)(15) as a whole it is clear that third parties are not contemplated to fall within
its protective bounds despite the absence of explicit language limiting it to former spouses.
Id. at 680; see also Woloshin, Tenenbaum and Natalie v. Harris (In re Harris), 203 B.R. 558,
559-61 (Bankr. D. Del. 1996) (dismissing a complaint filed by the debtor's attorney for a deter-
mination of nondischargeability under section 523(a)(15) for attorney's fees incurred in the
debtor's divorce proceeding). While acknowledging "the literal application" of the provision
would permit any debt arising from the divorce to be subject to a nondischargeability
determination under section 523(a)(15), the court held that the legislative history of this
provision reflected an intent to limit the scope of the provision "to the debts owed to the
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Finally, the qualifying divorce-based debts are not automatically
nondischargeable. Section 523(c) of the Code requires that the
nondebtor spouse to whom the debt is owed file a complaint with the
bankruptcy court for an adversary hearing to determine the
nondischargeability of the debt.32 The complaint must be filed
within sixty days after the first date set for the meeting of the
creditors in accordance with Federal Bankruptcy Rule of Procedure
4007(c).
33
debtor's spouse or former spouse." Id.; Finaly, 190 B.R. at 315 (noting that section 523(a)(15)
does not apply to obligations to third parties).
32 See H.R. REP. No. 103-385, at 54-55, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3363-64; 4
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 25, 1 523.26, at 112 (stating that the creditor must
request a ruling on dischargeability). A spouse or ex-spouse with a claim against a debtor that
arose from a divorce or separation decree should be advised to file an adversary complaint with
the bankruptcy court for a determination of nondischargeability under both sections 523(a)(5)
and (a)(15). A determination of nondischargeability of alimony and support under section
523(a)(15) must be filed within 60 days of the date of the section 341 creditors meeting, pur-
suant to section 523(c) and Federal Bankruptcy Rule 4007(a) and (b). However, failure to file
a timely complaint will preclude such a determination, thus, any property settlement portion
of the divorce-based obligation will be discharged. Because of the exclusive jurisdiction and
time limitation prescribed for determinations of nondischargeability under section 523(a)(15),
nondebtor spouses must be proactive in filing a complaint for a determination of nondischarge-
ability. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 25, 523.21 n.3, at 106. But see Farmer
v. Osburn (In re Osburn), 203 B.R. 811, 812 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996) (overruling the debtor's
objection to a plaintiffs amendment of her original complaint for a determination of
nondischargeability under section 523(a)(5) by adding a request for a determination of
nondischargeability under section 523(a)(15) subsequent to the 60-day bar date under Federal
Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c)). Because the amended complaint for a determination under section
523(a)(15) arose from the same conduct as the original complaint which was filed within the
60-day bar date, the court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the matter. See id.
13 See H.R. REP. NO. 103-385, at 54-55, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3363-64; 4
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 25, 523.26, at 112. The court in In re Minnick offered
a different interpretation of this procedural question under section 523(a)(15). See In re
Minnick, 198 B.R. 187 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1996). In this case the non-debtor spouse had received
notice of the debtor's petition, but on the advice of her attorney, she understood the notice to
relate to the debtor's obligation to make child support payments and was advised that such
obligations were nondischargeable in bankruptcy. See id. at 187. Accordingly, she believed
the debtor would also remain liable for a divorce-related obligation to pay a motor vehicle loan
which he agreed to assume in lieu of support, and thus, did not file a complaint for a
determination of dischargeability within the 60 days required under Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c).
See id. The court held that the burden of bringing an adversary proceeding for such a
determination rested with the debtor and not the creditor. See id. at 190.
This court noted that the addition of subsection (15) to section 523(a) did nothing but bring
confusion to the dischargeability of divorced-based obligations. See id. at 188. That is, the
addition of section (a)(15) did "nothing more than what (a)(5) was already doing, with one
exception. In effect, it essentially adds a potential defense for the debtor to discharge certain
awards in property settlement agreements when he or she 'does not have ability to pay' or
when it causes an undue hardship." Id. Accordingly, the court read section (a)(15) as an
affirmative defense for the debtor against the nondischargeability of the property settlement
and thus should mean that the debtor should bear the burden of raising the defense by an
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Thus, certain requirements of section 523(a)(15) are clearly
delineated and generally accepted when applying the provision. The
legislative history makes it clear that the kinds of debts falling
within its scope are those which arise from a divorce or separation
decree and are not in the nature of alimony or support.3 4 There is
no question that nondischargeability is rebuttable where the debtor
does not have the ability to pay the debt or when payment of the
debt is possible but the detriment of nondischargeability to the
nondebtor spouse is outweighed by the benefits of discharge for the
debtor.35 It is generally accepted that only the party to the divorce
has standing to object to discharge under this provision, not third
parties who would benefit from nondischarge of the obligation.36
However, the complexity of the provision raises several
interpretive and procedural questions that are not clearly resolved
by the language of the provision or addressed in the legislative
history. These questions can be described as follows:
1. Who bears the burden of proof under the provision-the
debtor or the nondebtor spouse?
2. What is the standard of measurement to be applied in
assessing the debtor's ability to pay the debt?
3. What time period(s) should the courts look to when
assessing the debtor's ability to pay?
4. Is a partial discharge of the debt permissible, or does it
require an "all or nothing" discharge of the debt if the debtor
has some income to pay a portion of the debt but not enough
to pay the entire debt?
5. What factors should be considered in balancing the benefits
of the debtor's discharge against the detriments of discharge
to the nondebtor spouse.3 v
adversary proceeding. See id. at 189. However, section 523(c) places the burden of bringing
a complaint for an adversary proceeding on the nondebtor spouse or child of the debtor,
otherwise the debt is to be discharged. See id.
The court found this confusing and in order to achieve a reasonable interpretation of the
Code provisions and to effect its objectives and to promote justice, it held that the issues of
dischargeability of this debt should be governed by 523(a)(5) with "[the burden.., upon the
debtor to bring an Adversary Proceeding under § 523(a)(5) to determine whether the debt is
dischargeable under § 523(a)(5) and [then] whether subsection (a)(15) is applicable." Id. at 190.
34 See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 54, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3363; 4 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 25, 523.21, at 104 (summarizing the legislative history of section
523(a)(15)).
" See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 54, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3363.
36 See id. at 55, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3364.
3 These categories of issues reflect those identified by numerous courts that have applied
section 523(a)(15) since its effective date. See McGinnis v. McGinnis (In re McGinnis), 194 B.R.
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Through a review and analysis of these issues as they have
developed in the rather significant body of case law that has evolved
since the enactment of section 523(a)(15), one can find some
interpretive and potential legislative solutions to improve the
provision's clarity and to achieve greater efficacy of its goals.
B. Case Law Analysis of Section 523(a)(15): Resolving Interpretive
and Procedural Issues
There is a general consensus among the courts that section
523(a)(15) first requires the bankruptcy court to determine whether
the debt in question is one that the debtor incurred under a divorce
or separation agreement, that it is a debt owed to the nondebtor
spouse, and that the debt does not fall within the scope of section
523(a)(5) as alimony or support.3' Additionally, the nondebtor
spouse must seek this determination by filing a complaint for an
adversary hearing within sixty days of the first date set for the
meeting of creditors.39 When seeking this nondischargeability
determination under section 523(a)(15), the nondebtor spouse bears
the burden of establishing that the debt does not fall within the
scope of section 523(a)(5) as alimony, maintenance or support and
that it is one incurred by the debtor pursuant to the divorce or
separation agreement.4 ° However, the courts are divided as to who
917, 920-21 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996) (holding that a bankruptcy court should examine the
debtor's current and future circumstances when inquiring into whether the debtor has suf-
ficient disposable income to pay the debt incurred in a divorce); Humiston v. Huddelston (In
re Huddelston), 194 B.R. 681, 689 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) (finding that in balancing the benefit
of discharge to the debtor against the detriment to the party to whom the obligation is owed,
the court should consider "the income and expenses of each party, the nature of the debt in
question, and the former spouse's ability to pay"); Bodily v. Morris (In re Morris), 193 B.R. 949,
952 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that "once the [creditor] demonstrates that the [diebtor
incurred the debt in connection with divorce, the burden shifts to the [diebtor to prove
subsections (A) and (B)" of section 523(a)(15)); Gantz v. Gantz (In re Gantz), 192 B.R. 932, 937
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that a debtor's new spouse's income is properly considered in
determining nondischargeability of debt); In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102, 107-08 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1996) (holding that the debtor's ability to pay should be -determined as of the date of trial of
the action to have the debt declared nondischargeable); Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 191 B.R.
760, 763 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.), affd, 199 B.R. 37 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that "[t]he party seeking
to establish an exception to the discharge of a debt bears the burden of proof").
31 See cases cited infra note 43.
'9 See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 54-55, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3363-64. Section
523(c) was amended by the Reform Act to add section 523(a)(15) to the list of nondischargeable
debts that creditors must affirmatively request a determination of nondischargeability from
the bankruptcy court within sixty days of the first date set for the meeting of creditors. See
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106, 4133.
40 See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 54-55, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3363-64.
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bears the burden of proof between the debtor and the nondebtor
spouse under subsections (A) and (B) of section 523(a)(15).
1. Who Bears the Burden of Proof Under Section 523(a)(15)(A)
and (B): The Debtor or the Nondebtor Spouse?
Although the courts are divided about who has the burden of proof
under subsections (A) and (B), a clear majority view has evolved. As
noted in virtually every case addressing this provision, the burden
of proof on questions of discharge usually falls on the objecting
creditor in favor of the debtor receiving the benefits of a "fresh start"
through discharge.4' The standard of proof is by a preponderance
of evidence as established under Grogan v. Garner.42 Nevertheless,
a majority of the courts have interpreted the burden of proof under
section 523(a)(15) to require that the nondebtor spouse first prove
that the debt qualifies as the type of nonsupport divorce-based debt
covered by section 523(a)(15).43 The courts then require that the
41 See cases cited infra note 43.
42 498 U.S. 279 (1991).
* See Wynn v. Wynn (In re Wynn), 205 B.R. 91, 101 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997) (following the
majority on the debtor's burden of proof under subsections (A) and (B); Ginter v. Crosswhite
(In re Crosswhite), 1996 WL 756745, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. July 3, 1996) (same); Wolfe v.
McCartin (In re McCartin), 204 B.R. 647, 654-55 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (same); Jenkins v.
Jenkins (In re Jenkins), 202 B.R. 102, 104 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1996) (following the majority view
requiring the nondebtor spouse to establish the applicability of section 523(a)(15) and then
shifting the burden to the debtor to prove either defenses under subsections (A) or (B));
Henderson v. Henderson (In re Henderson), 200 B.R. 322, 324 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996) (same);
Cleveland v. Cleveland (In re Cleveland), 198 B.R. 394, 397-98 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) (holding
that the "creditor bears the initial burden of establishing that the debt owed to it actually arose
in connection with a divorce or separation agreement .... [f]rom and after that point, however,
the burden ... shifts to the debtor"); Johnston v. Henson (In re Henson), 197 B.R. 299, 303
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1996) (opining that "[ulpon the non-debtor's proof that the debt was incurred
in the course of the divorce or later order, the burden shifts to the debtor to demonstrate either
that the debtor does not have the ability to pay the debt or that discharging the debt would
result in a benefit to the debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to the former
spouse"); Schmitt v. Eubanks (In re Schmitt), 197 B.R. 312, 316 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996)
(same); Samayoa v. Jodoin (In re Jodoin), 196 B.R. 845, 853 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1996) (adopting
the majority view believing it provided "the best fit to the statutory language and apparent
policies among three plausible analyses"); Sterna v. Paneras (In re Paneras), 195 B.R. 395, 403
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that once the nondebtor spouse establishes that the debt falls
within the category of the divorce-based debt described under 523(a)(15) "the burden of going
forward shifts to [the debtor]" to prove the elements of (A) or (B), that the debtor does not have
the ability to pay the debt.from monies needed to support the debtor and his dependents or
that the benefits of discharge outweigh detriments of nondischarge to the nondebtor spouse,
respectively); Campbell v. Campbell (In re Campbell), 198 B.R. 467, 472-73 (Bankr. D.S.C.
1996) (following the majority view on the placement of the burden of proof, that is, once the
non-debtor spouse proves the debt is divorce-based the burden shifts to the debtor to prove
inability to pay or "undue hardship"); McGinnis v. McGinnis (In re McGinnis), 194 B.R. 917,
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920 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996) (opining that "the nondebtor spouse bears the initial bur-
den ... [and] [t]hereafter, the burden of coming forth shifts to the debtor"); Humiston v.
Huddelston (In re Huddelston), 194 B.R. 681, 685-86 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) (finding that once
the nondebtor spouse has met her initial burden, the burden shifts to the debtor to
demonstrate that he falls within the statute); Craig v. Craig (In re Craig), 196 B.R. 305, 308
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996) (adopting the "bifurcated approach; once the nondebtor spouse
establishes that the debt arose from a property settlement and that § 523(a)(15) applies, the
burden of proof shifts to the debtor to prove that the debtor does not have the ability to pay
the debt or that the benefit of discharging the debt outweighs any detriment to the nondebtor
spouse"); Christison v. Christison (In re Christison), 201 B.R. 298, 308 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996)
(following "the majority of courts which split the burden [of proof] between the parties"); Gantz
v. Gantz (In re Gantz), 192 B.R. 932, 935 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding that "the burden
shifts to the debtor to establish that the debt should be discharged under either subparagraph
(A) or (B) of [s]ection 523(a)(15)"); Simons v. Simons (In re Simons), 193 B.R. 48, 50 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. 1996) (indicating that "there is a 'rebuttable presumption that any property
settlement obligation arising from a divorce is nondischargeable unless the debtor can prove'
the applicability of § 523(a)(15)(A) or (B)" (quoting Slover v. Slover (In re Slover), 191 B.R. 886,
891 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1996))); In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102, 107 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996)
(finding that "[i]f the objecting creditor meets this burden of proof, then the burden shifts to
the debtor who must either prove an inability to pay the debt ... or that a discharge of the
debt would result in a benefit to the debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences of a
discharge to the spouse"); Straub v. Straub (In re Straub), 192 B.R. 522, 527-28 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1996) (holding that "[tihe non-debtor spouse's threshold burden is to merely show that she had
a divorce-related claim not covered by § 523(a)(5). Once meeting this rather minimal burden,
it becomes for the debtor to prove either that he has an inability to pay the obligation in the
face of his support and essential business obligations or alternatively, to show that discharging
the debt would give him a benefit which outweighs the detriment to the former spouse.");
Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 191 B.R. 760, 764 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.), affd, 199 B.R. 37 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (holding that once the nondebtor spouse establishes that he or she holds a claim against
the debtor other than alimony, maintenance, or support, the burden shifts to the debtor "to
show either ... that he [or she] lacks the ability to pay the debt from income or property not
needed to support [the debtor] and any dependents, or... that the discharge would be more
beneficial to [the debtor] than detrimental" to the party seeking the exception); Collins v.
Florez (In re Florez), 191 B.R. 112, 115 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (agreeing with the majority view
and finding a shifting burden); Scott v. Scott (In re Scott), 194 B.R. 375, 381 (Bankr. D.S.C.
1995) (finding that once the nondebtor spouse meets "her burden, the burden then shifts to the
[debtor] to show that he falls under one of the exceptions set forth in § 523(a)(15)"); Phillips
v. Phillips (In re Phillips), 187 B.R. 363, 367 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (holding that "[t]he
plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the debt is in the nature of support"); Florio v. Florio
(In re Florio), 187 B.R. 654, 657 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) (finding that section 523 "creates a
shifting burden between the plaintiff and the defendant debtor"); Anthony v. Anthony (In re
Anthony), 190 B.R. 433, 436 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) (finding that "[t]he burden is on the
debtor to prove the exceptions in subsection (15)"); Silvers v. Silvers (In re Silvers), 187 B.R.
648, 649 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) (finding that the language of the statute "suggests that at
least the burden of going forward is somewhat of a shifting one"); Carroll v. Carroll (In re
Carroll), 187 B.R. 197, 200 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995) (finding that after the creditor carries his
or her burden, it necessarily shifts to the debtor spouse); Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R. 750,
753 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (stating that generally "[a] creditor seeking judgment of
nondischargeability bears the burden of proof," however, under section 523(a)(15), the burden
falls on the debtor who must plead the defenses as affirmative defenses); Becker v. Becker (In
re Becker), 185 B.R. 567, 569 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) (finding that "section 523(a)(15) sets up
a rebuttable presumption that any property settlement obligation arising from a divorce is
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debtor bear the burden of proving that the debt should be discharged
under subsections (A) or (B) of section 523(a)(15)."
Within this majority, some courts have expressed interpretive
differences. Several courts have identified a similarity between
section 523(a)(15) and section 523(a)(8), which makes guaranteed
student loans nondischargeable unless the debtor can prove that
there is "undue hardship" if the debt is not discharged.45 The
shifting of the burden of proof onto the debtor is clearly stated under
section 523(a)(8) but is not addressed in the language of section
523(a)(15). Courts have found that section 523(a)(15), as it is
written, would not make sense if it required the plaintiff to bear the
burden of proof because the plaintiff would have no incentive to
prove that the debtor could not pay the debt, or that the benefits of
a discharge to the debtor outweigh the detriment of discharge to the
claimant.46
The court in In re Hill47 recalled in its comparative analysis of
sections 523(a)(8) and (a)(15), that in some of the first bills and
proposals providing for the nondischargeability of property set-
tlements, the provision was drafted with language very similar to
that found in section 523(a)(8). 48  It essentially provided that
"property divisions would be nondischargeable altogether, or that
they would be nondischargeable [under section 523(a)(15)] except in
the case of 'undue hardship.' 49 However, the "undue hardship"
standard was abandoned in the final provision because critics found
nondischargeable" unless the debtor can carry his or her burden).
44 See cases cited supra note 43.
41 See Hill, 184 B.R. at 754 (inquiring "as to whether an analysis similar to the one invoked
for 'undue hardship' in student loans should be utilized in dischargeability determinations").
Cf Christison, 201 B.R. at 307 (holding that college expenses and health insurance "are in the
nature of support and are nondischargeable"); Paneras, 195 B.R. at 403-04 (noting-the
exception to the placement of the burden of proof on the creditor under section 523(a)(8));
Florez, 191 B.R. at 116 n.6 (analogizing the "ability to pay" standard with the "undue hardship"
standard in section 523(a)(8) proceedings (citing Comisky v. Comisky (In re Comisky), 183 B.R.
883, 884 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995))); Phillips, 187 B.R. at 368 (citing section 523(a)(8) as an
example of burden-shifting in the context of discharge proceedings).
46 See, e.g., Hill, 184 B.R. at 753 (asserting that "[i]f the burden is placed on the Plaintiff
to show the Debtor does not have the ability to pay, the Plaintiff would want to fail to meet
the burden").
47 Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R. 750 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995).
48 See id. at 754 (stating that "undue hardship" does not apply to 523(a)(15) because the
section does not expressly provide for it).
41 Id. (quoting Margaret Dee McGarity, Family Law Provisions in the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994, 27 B.C.D. WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT (May 16, 1995)).
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it too harsh and believed that it would be more equitable to weigh
the consequences of a discharge between the parties.5"
Other courts in the majority have based their interpretation of the
burden of proof on the "plain language" of the provision. These courts
read section 523(a)(15) as creating a "rebuttable presumption" that
nonsupport obligations arising out of a divorce or settlement
agreement are nondischargeable unless the debtor proves an
inability to pay, or in the case of a debtor who is able to pay, that the
benefits of discharge outweigh the detriments of nonpayment to the
nondebtor spouse.51
There are two different minority interpretations of how the burden
of proof is to be placed. One interpretation is that under section
523(a)(15) the debtor does not bear any burden of proof on the
question of ability to pay, or the balancing of detrimental consequen-
ces between the debtor and the nondebtor spouse, thus placing the
o As the court in Woloshin, Tenenbaum and Natalie v. Harris (In re Harris), 203 B.R. 558,
560 (Bankr. D. Del. 1996) noted, "[s]ection 523(a)(15) has its genesis in House Bill 4711 [and]
the Spousal Equity in Bankruptcy Amendments of 1994," H.R. REP. NO. 103-835 (1994) (citing
J. SOMMER ET AL., COLLIER FAMILY LAW AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE I 6.07A[1] (1996)). The
version of section 523(a)(15)(A) in House Bill 4711 specifically described the first exception to
nondischargeability as excepting a debt from discharge where it "would impose an undue
hardship for the debtor." Once this provision reappeared in House Bill 5116, the final version
of section 523(a)(15), several changes had been made including the substitution of the "ability
to pay" test with the "undue hardship" test. As explained in Collier Family Law and the
Bankruptcy Code, this change was made because the "'undue hardship' [test] was too difficult
a test to meet." Id. It was noted that a finding of undue hardship "could leave a debtor bound
to pay a property settlement debt the debtor could not afford, even if enforcement of that debt
would make it impossible for the debtor to support current dependents, thereby undermining
the bill's principal goal of ensuring support for women and children." Id. Accordingly, the
assessment of the debtor's financial ability "was modified, through the adoption of the 'ability
to pay' language of section 1325(b) of the Code." Id.
" See Becker v. Becker (In re Becker), 185 B.R. 567, 569 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) (indicating
that "[b]y its language, section 523(a)(15) sets up a rebuttable presumption that any property
settlement obligation arising from a divorce is nondischargeable unless the debtor can prove
one of two things"). See also, e.g., McGinnis v. McGinnis (In re McGinnis), 194 B.R. at 920
(stating that the debtor must show lack of ability to pay or that the benefit of discharge
exceeds the consequent harm to the creditor); Humiston v. Huddelston (In re Huddelston), 194
B.R. 681, 686 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) (same); Gantz v. Gantz (In re Gantz), 192 B.R. 932, 935
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (same); Simons v. Simons (In re Simons), 193 B.R. 48, 50 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. 1996) (same); In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102, 108 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996) (same); Straub
v. Straub (In re Straub), 192 B.R. 522, 527 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1996) (same); Taylor v. Taylor (In
re Taylor), 191 B.R. 760, 765 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (same); Scott v. Scott (In re Scott), 194
B.R. 375, 378 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1995) (same); Florio v. Florio (In re Florio), 187 B.R. 654, 657
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) (same); Anthony v. Anthony (In re Anthony), 190 B.R. 433,438 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1995) (same); Silvers v. Silvers (In re Silvers), 187 B.R. 648, 649 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1995) (same); Carroll v. Carroll (In re Carroll), 187 B.R. 197, 200 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995)
(same).
1188 [Vol. 60
Nondischargeability of Divorce-Based Debts
entire burden of proof on the creditor.12 The court in In re Butler"
based its interpretation on the dissimilarity between sections
523(a)(15) and (a)(8). The court noted that under section 523(a)(8)
the educational loan is nondischargeable and the burden is on the
debtor to seek a determination for discharge; whereas, under section
523(a)(15), the debtor's discharge is presumed unless the ex-spouse
objects to it by filing an adversary complaint for a determination of
nondischargeability pursuant to section 523(c). 4  Moreover, the
court noted that the language of section 523(a)(8) demands proof by
the debtor that nondischargeability will impose "undue hardship"
and that under section 523(a)(15)(B) there must be a showing that
the benefits of discharge outweigh the detriment to the nondebtor
spouse.5" The court stated that it makes sense for the debtor to
bear the burden of showing "undue hardship" under section 523(a)(8);
whereas, under section 523(a)(15)(B) the nondebtor spouse is in the
best position to show how the discharge would be detrimental to him
or her.56 With respect to subsection (A) and its requirement that
there be a showing of the debtor's inability to pay, the court said that
this too should be a burden of proof requirement for the nondebtor
spouse and not one for the debtor because this should be shown on
the face of the debtor's petition.57  That is, it should be up to the
nondebtor spouse to prove that the debtor can pay despite what is
stated in the petition or plan.58
62 See Dressler v. Dressler (In re Dressier), 194 B.R. 290, 304 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1996) (holding
that the party seeking to establish an exception from discharge of the debt under section
523(a)(15) "bears the burden of production and proof on all elements of dischargeability");
Kessler v. Butler (In re Butler), 186 B.R. 371, 374 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995) (ruling that "the burden
of proof in § 523 hearings should be upon the objecting creditor"). See also Woodworth v.
Woodworth (In re Woodworth), 187 B.R. 174, 177 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (stating initially that
the nondebtor spouse "bears the burden of proof in this adversary proceeding," however, later
holding that the debt was dischargeable because the debtor had met the requirements of
subsection (A)).
Kessler v. Butler (In re Butler), 186 B.R. 371 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995).
See id. at 373-75. The court stated that the inclusion of section 523(a)(15) in section
523(c) supported its interpretation that the creditor bears the burden of proof because of the
requirement under subsection (c) that the creditor take affirmative action to pursue a
determination of nondischargeability. See id. at 374-75. Moreover, the court held that the
placement of the burden of proof on the creditor for a determination of nondischargeability is
consistent with the basic bankruptcy principle that the question of nondischargeability be
"narrowly construed" against the creditor. See id. at 375.






The other minority interpretation is that the debtor bears the
burden of proving dischargeability on the grounds of inability to pay
under subsection (A), and the nondebtor spouse bears the burden of
proving that a discharge of the debt does not outweigh the detrimen-
tal consequence to them under subsection (B). The court in In re
Hesson"9 describes this "bifurcation" of the burden of proof under
subsection (B) as appropriate because in cases where the debtor has
the ability to pay the debt, the creditor has the greatest ability and
motivation to show that the detrimental consequences of a discharge
outweigh its benefits to the debtor while the creditor has no
motivation to establish the debtor's inability to pay the debt under
subsection (A).6°
2. What Standard of Measurement is to be Applied in Assessing
the Debtor's Ability to Pay the Debt Under Section
523(a)(15)(A)?
Another interpretive question addressed by the courts in applying
section 523(a)(15) is how to measure the debtor's ability to pay the
debt. A majority of bankruptcy courts have looked at the similarity
between the language used by Congress in section 523(a)(15)(A) and
section 1325(b)(2), which provides for the "disposable income test" to
be used in determining a debtor's ability to pay prepetition debts
under a chapter 13 plan.61 These courts, following the lead of the
court in Hill,6 2 have argued that the similarity in the language
between the two provisions serves as a directive to the courts to
apply the "disposable income test" of section 1325(b)(2) when
assessing the debtor's ability to pay under section 523(a)(15)(A)
" Collins v. Hesson (In re Hesson), 190 B.R. 229 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995).
60 See id. at 239 (explaining the bifurcation of the burden of proof). Cf. Morris v. Morris (In
re Morris), 197 B.R. 236, 243 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1996) (explaining that it is more convenient
for the court to have the debtor "present evidence as to his ability to pay").
61 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (1994). Section 1325(b)(2) defines disposable income as:
[I]ncome which is received by the debtor and which is not reasonably necessary to be
expended-
(A) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; and
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for
the continuation, preservation, and operation of such business.
Id.
02 See Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R. 750, 755 (noting that section 523(a)(15)(A)'s language
mirrors that of section 1325(b)(2)).
"3 See id. at 755 ("The use of the phrase 'ability to pay' in Section 523(a)(15)(A) directs the
Court to Section 1325(b)(2)'s 'disposable income' test. The language of Section 523(a)(15)(A)
essentially mirrors the language of Section 1325(b)(2)."). See also, e.g., Soforenko v. Soforenko
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The "disposable income test" requires the court to consider whether
the debtor's listed expenses are "reasonably necessary" for the
support and maintenance of the debtor and the debtor's dependents
or business. 64  The court in In re Taylor65 found the standard for
the ability to pay makes both practical and logical sense:
It is practical because most Chapter 7 debtors do not have the
available cash on hand to presently satisfy such claims in one
lump sum and at the same time meet their current living
expenses-lack of cash to pay all claims now or in the near
future is why so many debtors file for relief under Chapter 7.
It is also logical because the relevant statutory language of
§ 523(a)(15)(A) is identical to that contained in § 1325(b)(2)(A)
and (B).
66
Other courts have found the application of the "disposable income
test" to be insufficient for making a determination of the debtor's
ability to pay under section 523(a)(15) because of the dissimilarities
between the two provisions.67 These courts note that section
(In re Soforenko), 203 B.R. 853, 864 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (following the majority of courts
in adopting the disposable income test to determine a debtor's ability to pay the debt under
523(a)(15). The court stated that this test "consists of weighing the debtor's income against
expenses and determining whether, after allowing for what is reasonably necessary for support
there is anything left over."); Wolfe v. McCartin (In re McCartin), 204 B.R. 647, 654 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1996) (following the disposable income test in determining the debtor's ability to pay
under subsection (A)); Jenkins v. Jenkins (In re Jenkins), 202 B.R. 102, 104 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1996) (stating that most courts use the "disposable income test" because the language mirrors
§ 523(a)(15)); Morris, 197 B.R. at 243; Campbell v. Campbell (In re Campbell), 198 B.R. 467,
473-74 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996); Sterna v. Paneras (In re Paneras), 195 B.R. 395,404 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1996); Craig v. Craig (In re Craig), 196 B.R. 305, 310 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996); Bodily v.
Morris (In re Morris), 193 B.R. 949, 953 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996); Christison v. Christison (In
re Christison), 201 B.R. 298, 300 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996); Belcher v. Owens (In re Owens), 191
B.R. 669, 674 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1996); Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 191 B.R. 760, 765 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill.), affd, 199 B.R. 37 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Collins v. Florez (In re Florez), 191 B.R. 112, 115
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995); Hesson, 190 B.R. at 237; Phillips v. Phillips (In re Phillips), 187 B.R.
363, 368-69 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995); Carroll v. Carroll (In re Carroll), 187 B.R. 197, 200
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995).
64 See Taylor, 191 B.R. at 765.
" Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 191 B.R. 760 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.), affd, 199 B.R. 37 (N.D. Ill.
1996).
66 Id. at 765-66.
17 See Humiston v. Huddelston (In re Huddelston), 194 B.R. 681,686 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996)
(reasoning that "[d]issimilarities between the two sections ... have required extensive tailoring
of the section 1325(b)(2) standard in order to make it fit comfortably upon the frame of section
523(a)(15)(A)"); Straub v. Straub (In re Straub), 192 B.R. 522, 528 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1996)
(comparing and distinguishing section 523(a)(15) with section 1325(b)(2)); see also Florio v.
Florio (In re Florio), 187 B.R. 654, 657 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) (refusing to turn to section
1325(b)(2)'s definition of disposable income when interpreting the meaning of "ability to pay
such debt from income"). But cf Anthony v. Anthony (In re Anthony), 190 B.R. 433, 437
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1325(b)(2) limits the measurement of a debtor's ability to pay to the
effective date of the chapter 13 plan confirmation and does not
address the dischargeability of debts, but focuses on the debtor's
ability to make payments of prepetition debts under the plan.68
One court observed that the limited focus of the debtor's financial
abilities under section 1325(b)(2) is not consistent with the broader
focus intended under section 523(a)(15) 69 The court in In re Hud-
delston ° expressed this point very clearly:71
Unlike any analysis under section 1325(b)(2), which actually
turns on the ability to make payments in bankruptcy, section
523(a)(15) looks beyond to the debtor's ability to pay after the
bankruptcy event. Given this ultimate focus of inquiry,
courts must afford at least some consideration to the impact
of the debtor's bankruptcy and discharge upon his financial
abilities. Indeed, any standard which focuses on the debtor's
current financial burden without taking into account the
effect of his impending discharge may not be said to properly
measure the debtor's ability to pay a divorce-related debt,
upon its relegation to nondischargeability. If nothing else,
simple equity, as well as the text and policy of section
523(a)(15), demands a broader inquiry than that based upon
a "snap-shot" which fails to take into account impending
changes in the scope of the debtor's financial obligations.72
Accordingly, these courts have argued that an inquiry like that
used under section 523(a)(8) is more appropriate in making a
determination of the debtor's ability to pay under section
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) (finding the factors that courts use when determining a debtor's ability
to pay under section 1325(b)(2) helpful in deciding the outcome of a proceeding under section
523(a)(15)).
88 See Huddelston, 194 B.R. at 687; Straub, 192 B.R. at 528.
" See Huddelston, 194 B.R. at 687-88. See also Florio, 187 B.R. at 657 (stating that the
determination of a debtor's ability to pay under section 523(a)(15) "must be made on a case by
case basis" rather than turning to section 1325(b)(2)'s disposable income test).
70 Humiston v. Huddelston (In re Huddelston), 194 B.R. 681 (Bankr, N.D. Ga. 1996).
71 See id. at 688 (discussing the "broader net of inquiry" required under section 523(a)(15)
to determine the financial abilities of the debtor).
72 Id. at 687 (citations omitted); see also Ginter v. Crosswhite (In re Crosswhite), 1996 WL
756745, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. July 3, 1996) (stating that in considering the debtor's ability
to pay, the court "may look beyond a debtor's current financial circumstances and may consider
the income a debtor is reasonably capable of earning" (citing Huddelston, 194 B.R. at 688;
Straub, 192 B.R. at 528-29)); Straub, 192 B.R. at 528 (noting that "[s]ection 523(a)(15)(A) does
not restrict the court's inquiry to a 'present' ability to pay the debt nor should it").
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523(a)(15)(A).73 The inquiry under the "undue hardship" test of
section 523(a)(8) demands a broader inquiry into a debtor's financial
ability at and after bankruptcy.74 The court in Huddelston iden-
tified the scope of the inquiry to include: the debtor's disposable
income at the time of the trial; the future employment opportunities
of the debtor; the extent that the debtor's financial burdens will be
reduced in bankruptcy; and the extent the debtor has made a good
faith attempt to be fully employed.75 In assessing a debtor's ability
to pay under section 523(a)(15)(A), several courts have found it
appropriate to consider any contribution of income from a new
spouse or live-in companion of the debtor.7 6
The court in In re Jodoin7 7 took a different view of the ap-
plicability of the these two tests in arriving at determinations of
nondischargeability under section 523(a)(15)(A). The court agreed
that the "disposable income test" of section 1325(b) would be a good
test to begin the inquiry regarding the debtor's ability to pay, but
cautioned that inquiry should not be limited to this test.78 It
reasoned that because the "disposable income test" inquiry is limited
to a debtor's ability to pay a debt under a three year plan in chapter
13 cases, it would have to be modified to accommodate the cir-
cumstances of repayment of a nondischargeable debt in a chapter 7
liquidation which has an "indefinite horizon in mind."79 Moreover,
the court noted that the disposable income test was best used in
cases where the issues to be considered were "purely financial,"
noting that in divorce cases many "nonfinancial factors that are
73 See, e.g., Huddelston, 194 B.R. at 688 (noting that the exception under section 523(a)(15)
resembles the exception of section 523(a)(8)); Straub, 192 B.R. at 528 (same); Florio, 187 B.R.
at 657 (same); Anthony, 190 B.R. at 439 n.5 (noting that familiar policy bases exist in other
subsections of 523). But cf. Bodily v. Morris (In re Morris), 193 B.R. 949, 953 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1996) (disagreeing with the view that the disposable income test is not broad and that it does
permit courts to "consider reasonably projectable future events known at the time of trial").
The court stated that to inject the "undue hardship" test of section 523(a)(8) simply causes
confusion in applying section 523(a)(15)(A). See id.
74 See Huddelston, 194 B.R. at 688-89.
7 See id. at 688; see also Cleveland v. Cleveland (In re Cleveland), 198 B.R. 394, 398 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1996) (citing the same factors as Huddelston).
'0 See Cleveland, 198 B.R. at 398 (stating that the court must factor in "supplemental
income from a new spouse or live-in companion" in order to evaluate the debtor's ability to
pay); In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102, 108 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996) (same); Comisky v. Comisky (In
re Comisky), 183 B.R. 883, 883-84 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995) (same); Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184
B.R. 750, 755 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (same).
7" Samayoa v. Jodoin (In re Jodoin), 196 B.R. 845 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1996).
78 See id. at 854 (noting that the "disposal income test" was a good starting place but that
it "should not be the exclusive test").
79 Id. at 854.
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fundamentally subjective" have to be considered in assessing a
debtor's ability to pay a divorce-based obligation. 0 Accordingly, a
modified test permitting the use of both the disposable income test
and the more flexible "undue hardship" test of section 523(a)(8)
would allow a more realistic look at a debtor's ability to pay the
divorce-based debts. As the court stated:
The sad reality of domestic relations cases is that subjective
nonfinancial factors become important when spouses respond
to the intense personal pain attendant to a failed marriage by
refusing to work or by intentionally impairing their ability to
earn income .... The "undue hardship" concept developed
under § 523(a)(8) affords more latitude to entertain subjective
factors than the "disposable income" test and functions better
in situations where the debtor is engaging in sub-rational or
self-destructive economic behavior.
8 1
The court concluded that this modified test compensates for the
absence of an "explicit" good faith requirement under chapter 7 as is
found in chapter 13, and it compliments the balancing test under
section 523(a)(15)(B) which the court notes "functions as a limiting
principle whenever the court concludes, for subjective nonfinancial
reasons, that the debtor does not lack the ability to pay. "82
3. What Time Period(s) Should the Courts Look at When Asses-
sing the Debtor's Ability to Pay Under Section 523(a)(15)(A)?
Another issue related to the interpretation and application of
section 523(a)(15)(A) is the "point of inquiry" the court must consider
when determining whether the debtor has the ability to pay. That
is, does the court look at the debtor's financial ability at the time the
bankruptcy petition was filed, at the time the complaint for a
determination of nondischargeability was filed, or at the time of the
trial? The provision gives no direction on this question and the
courts have been very divided as to which point of inquiry is
appropriate.
In some of the early cases interpreting and applying section
523(a)(15)(A), the courts provided little explanation for their
decisions as to the point of inquiry used in assessing the debtor's
ability to pay. For example, in Hill the court simply identified the
so See id.
Id.
s2 Id. at 855.
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time for measuring the ability to pay as the date of the complaint, 3
the court in In re Carroll appeared to have based its assessment
on the schedules filed at the time of the bankruptcy petition, 5 and
in In re Anthony8 6 and In re Becker,"7 the courts looked at the
schedules filed at the time of the bankruptcy petition with some
additional consideration of post-petition changes to the debtor's
circumstances. 8
In later decisions, a majority of the courts rejected the view that
the date of the bankruptcy petition is the appropriate point of
inquiry.89 These courts either identified the date of the trial as the
appropriate time to begin making the inquiry, or were of the opinion
that no specific time limit for the inquiry should be identified.9"
83 See Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R. 750, 754 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (finding that the
appropriate measuring point is the date of the filing of the complaint for purposes of both
affirmative defenses).
86 Carroll v. Carroll (In re Carroll), 187 B.R. 197 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995).
85 See id. at 200 (finding that "[slection 523(a)(15) concerns the relative positions of the
parties as of the date of the filing of the bankruptcy").
8 Anthony v. Anthony (In re Anthony), 190 B.R. 433 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995).
87 Becker v. Becker (In re Becker), 185 B.R. 567 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995).
8 See Anthony, 190 B.R. at 38 & n.4 (noting that the court's concern was with the facts as
they existed at the time of the bankruptcy filing, but it also considered the debtor's financial
position at the time of hearing); Becker, 185 B.R. at 569-70 (discussing the debtor's bankruptcy
schedules, noting that her income had decreased since the filing of the bankruptcy petition).
8 See Johnston v. Henson (In re Henson), 197 B.R. 299, 303 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1996);
Schmitt v. Eubanks (In re Schmitt), 197 B.R. 312, 316 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996); Samayoa v.
Jodoin (In re Jodoin), 196 B.R. 845, 854 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1996); Sterna v. Paneras (In re
Paneras), 195 B.R. 395, 405 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); McGinnis v. McGinnis (In re McGinnis),
194 B.R. 917, 920 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996); Bodily v. Morris (In re Morris), 193 B.R. 949, 952
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996); Dressler v. Dressler (In re Dressler), 194 B.R. 290, 300 (Bankr. D.R.I.
1996); Christison v. Christison (In re Christison), 201 B.R. 298, 308 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996);
Gantz v. Gantz (In re Gantz), 192 B.R. 932, 934-35 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); In re Smither, 194
B.R. 102, 107-08 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996); Straub v. Straub (In re Straub), 192 B.R. 522, 528-29
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1996); Belcher v. Owens (In re Owens), 191 B.R 669, 674 (Bankr. E.D. Ky.
1996); Collins v. Hesson (In re Hesson), 190 B.R. 229, 238 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995); Taylor v.
Taylor (In re Taylor), 191 B.R. 760, 766-67 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.), affd, 199 B.R. 37 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
88 See Wolfe v. McCartin (In re McCartin), 204 B.R. 647, 654 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996)
(considering the debtor's disposable income at three time periods: the time the bankruptcy
petition was filed; the time of the adversary complaint was filed; and the time of the trial);
Henson, 197 B.R. at 303 (holding that the time of trial governs the inquiry); Schmitt, 197 B.R.
at 316 (same); Jodoin, 196 B.R. at 854 (same); Paneras, 195 B.R. at 405 (holding that a court
should take into account the debtor's financial circumstances at the time of filing, the time of
trial and "reasonably foreseeable short-term future prospects"); McGinnis, 194 B.R. at 920
(inquiry begins with debtor's circumstances at time of trial, but also assesses debtor's prospects
for the foreseeable future); Morris, 193 B.R. at 953 (time of trial); Dressier, 194 B.R. at 300
(same); Christison, 201 B.R. at 309 (same); Gantz, 192 B.R. at 935 (concluding that the date
of trial is appropriate starting point, but not a limitation); Smither, 194 B.R. at 107 (holding
that inquiry into debtor's financial strength is not controlled by a mere "snapshot" of the
debtor's circumstances at the time of trial); Straub, 192 B.R. at 528 (concluding that inquiry
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Several courts have expressed the view that limiting the date of
inquiry to the time the bankruptcy petition was filed would preclude
consideration of changes which might be relevant in the debtor's
circumstances that may have occurred between the time the petition
was filed and the date of the trial.9 Other courts expressed similar
concerns holding that in order to permit a consideration of the
debtor's current and future financial circumstances, including the
debtor's future ability to earn income to pay the obligation, the
inquiry should not be restricted to a specific date.92
begins with debtor's circumstances at time of trial, but also assesses debtor's prospects for the
foreseeable future); Owens, 191 B.R. at 674 (holding that the time of trial governs the inquiry);
Hesson, 190 B.R. at 238 (same); Taylor, 191 B.R. at 766-67 (considering debtor's present and
future income).
9" See Henderson v. Henderson (In re Henderson), 200 B.R. 322, 326 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1996) (holding that the inquiry into the debtor's financial condition should not be a "snapshot"
inquiry but one that allows "'a court to consider the debtor's prospective earning ability'"
(quoting Smither, 194 B.R. at 107)); Campbell v. Campbell (In re Campbell), 198 B.R. 467, 473
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1996) (noting that the benefits of basing the determination of nondis-
chargeability on circumstances existing at the time of the trial is that one can consider the
debtor's present financial condition, including "the benefits that a debtor may have received
from a discharge of other debts in a Chapter 7"); Morris v. Morris (In re Morris), 197 B.R. 236,
244 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1996) (rejecting the view that the time of inquiry should be the date
of the petition and finding that the "appropriate time at which to begin its inquiry is with the
date of trial"); Morris, 193 B.R. at 953 ("Measuring the parties' financial positions at the time
of trial enables the court to consider these changed events, and determine in its experience
which events are bona fide."); Craig v. Craig (In re Craig), 196 B.R. 305, 310 (Bankr. E:D. Va.
1996) (expressing the view that the "correct approach" to determine whether a debtor's
expenses are reasonably necessary "is not to determine whether the debtor has the ability to
pay the debt at any certain time, but to examine whether the debtor can pay the debt over
time"); Dressier, 194 B.R. at 300-01 (agreeing with the view that the appropriate time to
analyze the question of the debtor's ability to pay was the trial date); Gantz, 192 B.R. at 935
("[T]he Court finds that, at a minimum, the date of trial is an appropriate starting point in
examining the relative positions of the parties. This finding should, in no way, limit courts
from considering extenuating facts that may have a direct bearing on a debtor's financial
circumstances."); Hesson, 190 B.R. at 238 (rejecting the view that the date of the petition is the
relevant time to measure the defenses against nondischargeability and maintaining that the
more appropriate measuring point should be the time of trial).
92 See Henson, 197 B.R. at 303 ("(Tlhe Court views the parties' circumstances as of the time
of trial, rather than any earlier date, in order to fully examine the benefits of the 'fresh start'
to the debtor, any change in circumstances in employment, and other good or bad fortune
which may have befallen the parties. In considering changed events, and particularly the
benefits of discharge, the current and future financial circumstances of the parties are better
analyzed."); Schmitt, 197 B.R. at 316 (same); Paneras, 195 B.R. at 405 ("Absent a specific time
referenced in the statute, and lacking a rule for guidance, the Court will consider the parties'
relative positions not only at the time of the petition, but also throughout the time of trial, in
light of any reasonably foreseeable short-term future -prospects for the parties as indicated by
the evidence adduced."); McGinnis, 194 B.R. at 920 ("[T]his Court will not restrict its review
of the Debtor's financial condition as of some historical point in time, but instead will examine
the Debtor's current and future circumstances."); Smither, 194 B.R. at 108 ("[A] Court may
consider facts and circumstances concerning a debtor's future earning potential, as well as his
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4. Is a Partial Discharge of a Debt Permissible Under Section
523(a)(15), or Does it Require an "All or Nothing"
Determination?
While the majority of courts interpreting section 523(a)(15) have
issued orders for either full discharge or nondischarge of the debt,
only a few have addressed the question of whether, under this
provision, a partial discharge of an obligation is permissible in cases
where there is a finding that the debtor can pay only a portion of the
debt.9 3  This question was decided first in In re Comisky.94  The
court looked to bankruptcy court decisions under section 523(a)(8)
allowing partial discharge of student loans, to support its ruling for
providing a partial discharge and a partial nondischarge of divorce-
based obligations. 95 As the court noted, section 523(a)(8) "provides
for a nondischargeable debt with two exceptions."96 Bankruptcy
courts have permitted partial discharge and nondischarge orders of
guaranteed student loans under section 523(a)(8) where a debtor
or her income as of the date of the trial ... in determining his ability to pay."); Straub, 192
B.R. at 528-29 ("[Tlhe inquiry begins with an analysis of the debtor's current financial cir-
cumstances, but ends with an inquiry whether that situation is fixed or is likely to change in
the foreseeable future. Section 523(a)(15)(A) does not restrict the court's inquiry to a 'present'
ability to pay the debt nor should it, since to impose or imply such a restriction would in many,
if not most cases, render the provision's objective a nullity."); Taylor, 191 B.R. at 767
("[Aippropriate construction of § 523(a)(15)(A) requires the Court to consider [the debtor's]
future ability to pay the claim over time, as well as his ability at the time he filed the
bankruptcy petition.").
" See Campbell, 198 B.R. at 474 (holding that a partial discharge may be appropriate in
some circumstances under section 523(a)(15) (citing Comisky v. Comisky (In re Comisky), 183
B.R. 883 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995))); McGinnis, 194 B.R. at 921 (adopting the view that a section
523(a)(15) debt may be discharged in part were the debtor has the ability to pay a "material
part of the property settlement within a reasonable amount of time") (citing Smither, 194 B.R.
at 107); Smither, 194 B.R. at 110 (holding that the court may "equitably modify the
obligation"); Comisky v. Comisky (In re Comisky), 183 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995)
(finding section 523(a)(15) to be analogous to section 523(a)(8) justifying partial discharge of
debts where the debtor has the ability to pay part but not all of the divorce-based obligation).
But cf. Taylor v. Taylor, 199 B.R. 37, 42 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (rejecting the "equitable middle
ground," noting that section 523(a)(15)(A) makes no provision for partial discharge); Collins v.
Florez (In re Florez), 191 B.R. 112, 115 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (adopting the "all or nothing"
approach to discharge taken in In re Silvers); Silvers v. Silvers (In re Silvers), 187 B.R. 648,
649 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) (interpreting nondischargeability under section 523(a)(15) to be
an "all or nothing situation"); Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R. 750, 755 n.15 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1995) (noting that the language of section 523(a)(15) seemed to suggest that Congress intended
to limit the question of discharge or nondischarge to an "'all or nothing' result").
"' Comisky v. Comisky (In re Comisky), 183 B.R. 883 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995).
9' See id. at 884.
96 Id.
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would suffer "undue hardship" if required to pay all of the loan.97
The court reasoned that because section 523(a)(15) similarly provides
for a nondischargeable debt with two exceptions, the allowance of a
partial discharge and nondischarge of property settlement obligations
under section 523(a)(15), in cases where the debtor had the ability to
pay a portion of the debt, was both "fair and sound.""
As the court noted in In re Smither, s the issue concerning the
permissibility of partial discharge of a debt will often require some
"equitable modification" of the debt by the court where the property
settlement obligation is to be paid in a lump sum.100 In such cases
the debtor would have little difficulty proving his or her inability to
pay the lump sum amount according to the original terms of the
divorce or separation agreement.' 01 However, with an equitable
modification of the debt amount and/or payment schedule, a debtor
may be found to have the ability to pay some of the debt.1 2 The
9" See id. Similarly, the courts are divided on the use of partial discharge under section
523(a)(8). Some courts have refused the partial discharge remedy on the grounds that the
language of section 523(a)(8) does not provide for partial discharge and requires an "all or
nothing" discharge. See Skaggs v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Skaggs), 196 B.R.
865, 866-67 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1996); Hawkins v. Buena Vista College (In re Hawkins), 187
B.R. 294, 300 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1995); United States v. Kephart, 170 B.R. 787, 790 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1994). Other courts have permitted partial discharge, finding that the equitable
nature of bankruptcy relief permits the courts to fashion equitable remedies. See Dennehy v.
Sallie Mae (In re Dennehy), 201 B.R. 1008, 1012-13 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1996); Raimondo v. New
York St. Higher Educ. Serv. Corp. (In re Raimondo), 183 B.R. 677,682 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995);
Gammoh v. Ohio Student Loan Comm'n (In re Gammoh), 174 B.R. 707, 711 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1994). As the court in Heckathorn v. United States Dept. of Educ. (In re Heckathorn), 199 B.R.
188 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1996), stated:
A statute must be read in context; and § 523(a)(8)(B) has an extensive context. The
Bankruptcy Code is embedded in equity and must be read accordingly.... Certain
provisions of the Code are not merely "embedded in" but grow directly from equity and
equitable remedies. In particular, the bankruptcy discharge is an injunction, 11 U.S.C.
§ 524(a)(2); and provisions relevant thereto, in particular §§ 523, 727 which effectively shape
the injunction, should be read as an expression of the equitable nature, function, and (it
necessarily follows) behavior of the injunctive remedy. It is therefore entirely proper to read
the exceptions to discharge in § 523(a), including (8)(B) thereof, in light of equity.
Id. at 194. See also Cheesman v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In re Cheesman), 25
F.3d 356, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that under section 105 the bankruptcy court has the
equitable power to provide any remedy that will further the goals of bankruptcy relief,
including a decision to stay a final determination of dischargeability under section 523(a)(8)
in order to see if a debtor's financial condition improves).
9' See Comisky, 183 B.R. at 884.
99 194 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996).
"00 See id. at 109 (noting that if the court applied the "all or nothing" approach, the debt
would be discharged since the debtor could not pay the judgment, due immediately, in full).
'' See id. at 109-10.
102 See id.
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Smither court held that the partial discharge approach was ap-
propriate and agreed with the Comisky court's adoption of this
approach from the section 523(a)(8) cases. °3 While the Smither
court rejected the view that section 523(a)(15) was intended to be an
"all or nothing" discharge provision, it cautioned for balance in
equitable modifications.0 4  The court favored rejecting
modifications in which a debtor would be paying small amounts of
the debt over many years simply because of "the existence of a small
amount of excess income in relation to the (a)(15) debt in ques-
tion."105
Conversely, the "all or nothing" approach to discharge under
section 523(a)(15) was adopted by the court in In re Florez.06 This
court was not persuaded by the "undue hardship" analysis used in
Comisky to permit a partial discharge of divorce-based debts by
analogizing with the partial discharge provision of section
523(a)(8). °7 While the court noted that the result of an "all or
nothing" approach might "nickel and dime" a debtor to make such
payments, such a result is an unfortunate consequence of section
523(a)(15)(A) when the debtor with a small salary has failed to meet
the burden of proving his or her inability to pay the debt. 08
Similarly, the court in Taylor rejected the Comisky court's approach
in allowing for a partial discharge. 109 It stated that "[tihe statute
makes no provision for determining that a part of a debt may be
found dischargeable, but the remainder nondischargeable ... [t]he
morass of § 523(a)(15) is difficult enough to judicially navigate, and
Congress needs to provide much needed legislative remediation."" °
103 See id.
104 See id. at 109.
10. Id. See also McGinnis v. McGinnis (In re McGinnis), 194 B.R. 917, 921 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1996) (holding that "a Debtor has the ability to pay an obligation... if the Debtor has suf-
ficient disposable income to pay all or a material part of the property settlement within a
reasonable amount of time" (citing Smither, 194 B.R. at 107)).
" Collins v. Florez (In re Florez), 191 B.R. 112, 115-16 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that
the debtor must discharge the entire amount of the obligation, paying what amounted to little
more than interest payments, for an indefinite period of time).
107 See id. at 116 n.6.
108 See id. at 116.
10' See Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 191 B.R. 760, 766 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.), affd, 199 B.R.
37 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
110 Id. For other cases expressing the view that an "all or nothing" discharge or
nondischarge was intended under section 523(a)(15), see Florez, 191 B.R. at 115-16; Silvers v.
Silvers (In re Silvers), 187 B.R. 648, 649 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995); Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184
B.R. 750, 755 n.15 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995).
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5. What Factors Should Be Considered in Applying the Balancing
Test of Section 523(a)(15)(B) and How Should It Be
Interpreted?
Section 523(a)(15) provides the debtor who has failed to prove an
inability to pay the debt with an additional way to justify the
dischargeability of the obligation. Under subsection (B), the debtor
will be granted a discharge of the obligation if he or she is able to
prove that "discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the
debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to a spouse,.
former spouse, or child of the debtor." 1'
The courts that have interpreted and applied subsection (B) have
uniformly adopted the view that a court must consider the "totality
of the circumstances" when balancing the effect that a discharge
might have on the parties. 112 The most common factors the courts
consider in making determinations under subsection (B) include: the
income and expenses of the parties; the debts for which the parties
are jointly liable; the number of dependents of the parties; the nature
of the debt in question, such as terms and amounts; the debtor's
reaffirmation of the debts; the claimant's ability to pay the debt; the
contributions and expenses a new spouse adds to the financial
circumstances of the debtor; the nondebtor spouse's prospects for
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(B) (1994).
112 See Cleveland v. Cleveland (In re Cleveland), 198 B.R. 394, 400 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996);
Morris v. Morris (In re Morris), 197 B.R. 236, 245 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1996); Samayoa v.
Jodoin (In re Jodoin), 196 B.R. 845, 855 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1996); Sterna v. Paneras (In re
Paneras), 195 B.R. 395, 404 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); Celani v. Celani (In re Celani), 194 B.R.
719, 721 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996); Humiston v. Huddelston (In re Huddelston), 194 B.R. 681,
689 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996); Craig v. Craig (In re Craig), 196 B.R. 305, 309 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1996) (citing Hill, 184 B.R. at 756); Christison v. Christison (In re Christison), 201 B.R. 298,
310 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996); Gantz v. Gantz (In re Gantz), 192 B.R. 932, 937 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1996); Taylor, 191 B.R. at 766; Florio v. Florio (In re Florio), 187 B.R. 654, 658 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1995); Hill, 184 B.R. at 755-56. See also Campbell v. Campbell (In re Campbell), 198 B.R.
467, 475 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996) (stating that "the Court [must] search for its own guidelines for
balancing the equities" and listing the factors to examine, but not limiting itself to those
factors); In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102, 111 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996) (stating that "[in order to
make this determination [of discharge under § 523(a)(15)(B)], at a minimum, a Court should
consider the following factors," then listing the factors and stating that "[tihis list of factors is
by no means exclusive"). Cf. Ginter v. Crosswhite (In re Crosswhite), 1996 WL 756745, at *6
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. July 3, 1996) (adopting the "totality of circumstances" standards, but doing
so begrudgingly, finding this standard to be too broad because it "suggests that just about
anything the parties may want to offer may be worthy of consideration"). Moreover, this court
believed that non-economic factors should not be considered under subsection (B) because the
court should be trying to "balance one party's economic benefit against another party's
economic detriment." Id. at *7.
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bankruptcy eligibility; and whether the parties have acted in good
faith."
3
Nevertheless, the courts differ in their approaches to interpreting
and applying subsection (B), and thus, illustrate that this provision
requires courts to make value judgments about which party suffers
the most."4 In interpreting and applying subsection (B), the court
in Hill heeded the legislative history which provided that "[t]he
benefits of the debtor's discharge should be sacrificed only if there
would be substantial detriment to the nondebtor spouse that
outweighs the debtor's need for a fresh start.""' 5 The Hill court
found the financial circumstances of both the debtor and nondebtor
spouse to be equally dire, and held that its discharge of the debt,
while constituting a detrimental consequence to the nondebtor
spouse, was in fact a "sensible solution to the combined problems of
the Plaintiff and the Debtor" since the plaintiff may subsequently file
chapter 7, if needed, and receive a discharge of the debt as well."'
The solution, according to the court, was for the nondebtor spouse to
also file a petition in bankruptcy to seek relief from the debt she
would ultimately be responsible for after the debtor's discharge." 7
One court was very critical of decisions which gave weight to the
possibility of the nondebtor spouse filing a petition in bankruptcy
when balancing the detrimental consequences of discharge under
section 523(a)(15)."8 The court in In re Christison"9 issued a
strong condemnation of this consideration:
11 See Cleveland, 198 B.R. at 400; Taylor v. Taylor, 199 B.R. 37, 41 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Morris,
197 B.R. at 245; Campbell, 198 B.R. at 474-75; Celani, 194 B.R. at 720-21; Huddelston, 194
B.R. at 689; Gantz, 192 B.R. at 936-37; Smither, 194 B.R. at 111; Taylor, 191 B.R. at 766;
Florio, 187 B.R. at 658; Hill, 184 B.R. at 755-56.
114 See Phillips v. Phillips (In re Phillips), 187 B.R. 363, 369 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995). But
see Crosswhite, 1996 WL 756745, at *6 (disagreeing with Congress on its expectation that the
bankruptcy courts have to "make a value judgment" under 523(a)(15)(B) and it was critical of
subsection (B) due to the failure of Congress to give guidance on how to balance the "debtor's
benefit against the creditor's detriment").
'1 Hill, 184 B.R. at 756 (quoting 140 CONG. REC. H10,752-1 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994)).
116 Id.
17 See id.; see also Jenkins v. Jenkins (In re Jenkins), 202 B.R. 102, 106 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1996) (stating that this is a case in "which '[a] discharge of debts by both parties ... [is] the
most. sensible solution'" (quoting Hill, 184 B.R. at 756)); Bodily v. Morris (In re Morris), 193
B.R. 949, 954 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) (granting a discharge where the debtor and nondebtor
spouse were both in financial difficulty and the equities were balanced, suggesting that the
best solution would be for both parties to file bankruptcy (citing Hill, 184 B.R. at 756)).
.. See Christison v. Christison (In re Christison), 201 B.R. 298, 311 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996).
"9 Christison v. Christison (In re Christison), 201 B.R. 298 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996).
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Such analyses cavalierly ignore questions of whether the
creditor spouse is eligible to file a bankruptcy case or is
entitled to receive a discharge under Section 727 or discharge
debts under Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code. In addition,
many individuals today continue to consider bankruptcy an
antithetical solution to oppressive debt, and courts should not
be in the business of forcing innocent parties into bankruptcy
because they regard that as the lesser evil under Section
523(a)(15) [of the Bankruptcy Code]....
Rather, the balancing test set forth in Section 523(a)(15)(B)
requires a court to examine the harm and benefits caused to
the parties in their existing situations. The fact that the non-
filing creditor spouse may later file bankruptcy is not a
relevant factor in weighing the relative impact to the respec-
tive parties. If a debtor spouse has disposable excess income,
the non-filing creditor spouse has no excess income and no
ability to pay joint liabilities which the debtor agreed to pay,
the harm to the creditor spouse generally will outweigh the
harm to the debtor.
120
The court in In re Owens'2 has interpreted the opportunity for
discharge under subsection (B) to mean that the nondischarge of the
obligation should be avoided "where the non-debtor spouse has
independent means, wealth, or a lack of need of the particular
payment involved or, arguably, where the non-debtor spouse has no
assets that can be reached by creditors.' 22 The parties in Owens
and Hill had similar financial circumstances. In Owens, however,
neither the debtor nor the nondebtor spouse were experiencing
extreme financial difficulty. The Owens court observed that if the
debtor is required to pay the debt he would live under a "very tight
budget," while noting that if the nondebtor spouse had to assume the
debt she too would experience similar financial demands.
123
Accordingly, the court found the debt to be nondischargeable; the
benefit of discharge for the debtor did not outweigh the detriments
120 Id. at 311. See also Wolfe v. McCartin (In re McCartin), 204 B.R. 647, 655 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1996) (rejecting the suggestion of the nondebtor spouse that filing for bankruptcy was
a means of improving her financial circumstances).
121 Belcher v. Owens (In re Owens), 191 B.R. 669 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1996).
122 Id. at 675. See also Taylor v. Taylor, 199 B.R. 37, 41-42 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that the
creditor's spouse, earning $750,000 a year, failed to show that she would suffer a significant
detriment if the $60,000 debt was discharged-substantially outweighing the benefit to the
debtor's spouse who was earning only $37,000 a year).
123 See Owens, 191 B.R. at 675.
1202 [Vol. 60
Nondischargeability of Divorce-Based Debts
to the nondebtor spouse and their financial circumstances were
equal.
124
The courts in In re Florio,'12 Anthony and Carroll have applied
subsection (B) in a manner such that the equities in balancing the
consequences of discharge are weighed against discharge when the
debtor has additional disposable income. 126  The Carroll court
stated that its decision against discharge was facilitated by a
"totality of the circumstances." 127 The factors it noted in reaching
its conclusion included: the nondebtor spouse's proof that she could
not meet her monthly expenses without receiving the debtor's
support; the nondebtor spouse's need for some financial contribution
from the debtor toward their child's college tuition; and the debtor's
past record of contempt orders from domestic relations courts for
nonsupport payments. 28 The court held that benefits of a dis-
charge of the debt to the debtor would be minimal in comparison to
the detriment the nondebtor spouse would suffer and that a
discharge in this case "would simply provide [the] Debtor with
additional disposable income to 'use at his discretion.""29  The
court did not believe this qualified as a benefit identified under
section 523(a)(15)."0
The court in Florio denied the debtor a discharge of a property
settlement where it found that the debtor had the ability to pay but
had voluntarily been underemployed and was able to earn sufficient
income to pay the debt.' Moreover, the debtor failed to show how
'2 See id.
12' Florio v. Florio (In re Florio), 187 B.R. 654 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995).
126 See id. at 658; Anthony v. Anthony (In re Anthony), 190 B.R. 433, 439 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1995); Carroll v. Carroll (In re Carroll), 187 B.R. 197, 201 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995).




121 See Florio, 187 B.R. at 658. Cf. Jenkins v. Jenkins (In re Jenkins), 202 B.R. 102, 106
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that the nondebtor spouse's underemployment was a factor to
be considered under the balancing test of section 523(a)(15)(B) (citing In re Smither, 194 B.R.
102, 111 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996))); Johnston v. Henson (In re Henson), 197 B.R. 299, 304
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1996) (finding that since the debtor had "chosen to limit his income and
employment" because he had the ability to earn more and thus pay the debt, he had failed in
meeting the burden of proving an inability to pay the debt); Humiston v. Huddelston (In re
Huddelston), 194 B.R. 681, 690 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) (holding that "[iun light of the voluntary
nature of [the debtor's] underemployment and his failure to pursue more lucrative oppor-
tunities" he could not claim an entitlement to a discharge on the grounds that he was not able
to pay the divorce-based obligations); In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102, 111 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996)
(holding "that voluntarily [sic] reduction should still be considered by the Court in making the
523(a)(15)(B) balancing test").
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she would benefit from the discharge and how it would outweigh any
detriment to the nondebtor spouse.'32 In Anthony the debt was not
discharged based on the fact that the debtor was financially able to
pay the debt and the nondebtor spouse's earnings would not allow
her to pay the debts.'33 The Anthony court did not include the
nondebtor spouse's substantial inheritance in balancing the conse-
quences of a discharge of the debt.
3 4
The court in Smither, disagreed with the application of subsection
(B) in Carroll, Florio and Anthony. It held that such an approach
"ignores the value of the Debtor's discharge and simply blends 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(B) into an inseparable mass with 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(15)(A) by making the existence of 'excess income' the
determinative test of 523(a)(15)(B)." 38 This court held that the
appropriate application of subsection (B) is
to review the financial status of the debtor and the creditor
and compare their relative standards of living to determine
the true benefit of the debtor's possible discharge against any
hardship the spouse, former spouse and/or children would
suffer as a result of the debtor's discharge. If, after making
this analysis, the debtor's standard of living will be greater
than or approximately equal to the creditor's if the debt is not
discharged, then the debt should be nondischargeable under
the 523(a)(15)(B) test. However, if the debtor's standard of
living will fall materially below the creditor's standard of
living if the debt is not discharged, then the debt should be
discharged under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(B).
3 6
In this case the court held that the debt should not be discharged
because the financial circumstances of the parties would be equal
regardless of whether the debt was discharged.3 7
III. REDEEMING SECTION 523(A)(15) THROUGH LEGISLATIVE
REVISION
In spite of the flawed draftsmanship of section 523(a)(15) and the
many interpretive challenges it presents for both the bankruptcy
... See Florio, 187 B.R. at 658.
133 See Anthony v. Anthony (In re Anthony), 190 B.R. 433, 440 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995).
134 See id.
131 Smither, 194 B.R. at 110.
136 Id. at 111 (citing Belcher v. Owens (In re Owens), 191 B.R. 669, 674-75 (Bankr. E.D. Ky.
1996)).
... See id. at 111-12.
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judiciary and the bar, it remains an important addition to the list of
nondischargeable debts in bankruptcy. Its goal to provide greater
protection for divorce-based debts that are not in the form of
alimony, support or maintenance-but are nevertheless critical to a
nondebtor spouse's and dependents' support and maintenance-is
appropriate. Society and its legislators must gain a greater
awareness of the devastating impact that divorce has on the financial
security of families, and they must come to appreciate that the
preservation and enforcement of this security is essential. Only then
will society require the fulfillment of financial obligations to families
for the general welfare of the citizenry, regardless of the new form
the family assumes as a result of divorce.
As Hegel noted in his views on marriage and divorce, the sad truth
of marriage is that it is dissoluble through divorce while in principle
it should not be dissoluble.'38 We as a society have accepted
divorce and its prevalence, and we now are having to address its
many consequences in all aspects of the law. Although the first
federal bankruptcy law enacted in 1800 did not specifically except
alimony and child support obligations from discharge, some courts at
that time did exclude alimony and child support from a debtor's dis-
charge.'39 Alimony and child support obligations were specifically
excepted from discharge under the bankruptcy laws through a 1903
amendment to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,14° the predecessor to
the Bankruptcy Code.1 ' The recent addition of section 523(a)(15)
to the Code to except other types of divorce-based obligations from
discharge completes our responsiveness to the financial effects of
divorce under bankruptcy law.
While the task of reviewing and determining the nature of
obligations arising out of a divorce is one of the most dreaded duties
for the bankruptcy judge, it is not likely to disappear. The
frustration the courts have encountered in applying section
523(a)(15) is well documented by case law, and calls for revision and
clarification of the provision are firmly justified. The following
discussion offers a legislative solution to the interpretive problems
revealed by the growing complex of case law addressing section
'3 See supra text accompanying note 1.
139 See J. Joseph Cohen, Note, Congressional Intent in Excepting Alimony, Maintenance, and
Support From Discharge in Bankruptcy, 21 J. FAM. L. 525, 526-29 (1982-83) (exploring the
establishment of the exception through case law analysis).
"4 Act of Feb. 5, 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-62, ch. 487, § 5, 32 Stat. 797, 798 (amending
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 544, 550) (repealed 1979).
141 See Cohen, supra note 139, at 528-29.
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523(a)(15), while achieving the goals of bankruptcy relief with
greater efficacy.
Before addressing the problems with section 523(a)(15), it is
important to restate which issues of interpretation and application
are clearly and generally accepted by the courts, and they are:
(1) the qualifying debt must not be alimony or support;
(2) the qualifying debt must be a debt actually incurred by
the debtor under a divorce or separation agreement;
(3) the status of the debt as nondischargeable is rebuttable
where it is established that the debtor does not have the
ability to pay the debt, or where the benefits of discharge to
the debtor outweigh the detriments of nondischarge to the
nondebtor spouse; and
(4) persons with standing to bring an objection to discharge
is limited to the nondebtor spouse to whom the debt is owed
and not third-party beneficiaries.142
The interpretive issues that are less clear and require resolution
when applying section 523(a)(15) are the following:
(1) who bears the burden of proof under the provision?;
(2) what standard of measurement is to be applied when
determining the debtor's ability to pay the debt?;
(3) what time period(s) should the court look at when
assessing the debtor's ability to pay (i.e., the time the
bankruptcy petition was filed or the time of the trial)?;
(4) is a partial discharge of the debt permissible or is an "all
or nothing" discharge of the debt intended?; and
(5) what factors should be considered in balancing the
benefits of the debtor's discharge against the detriments of
discharge to the nondebtor spouse?
The legislative intent of section 523(a)(15) is to prevent prepetition
obligations assumed under a divorce or separation decree that are
not in the nature of alimony or support-but are either hold
harmless agreements or other property settlements-from being
discharged at bankruptcy where the debtor has the ability to pay the
debt and the benefits of discharge do not outweigh the detriment of
discharge to the nondebtor spouse. 14 By making such obligations
142 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (establishing that certain criteria must be
met for section 523(a)(15) to apply).
14. See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text (analyzing the legislative history and
intent of section 523(a)(15) and determining the types of debt the statute was intended to
address).
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nondischargeable, Congress intended to hold debtors responsible to
their families, to assure financial support to needy ex-spouses and
their dependents in the satisfaction of marital debts, and to
guarantee the fair and equitable division of marital property.
144
Section 523(a)(15) was enacted in response to the common practice
of divorced obligors to have the majority, if not all, of the divorce or
separation decree obligations drafted as property settlement
obligations and to have them discharged if the bankruptcy court
concluded that the debt was a property settlement and not a
nondischargeable alimony or a support obligation covered under
section 523(a)(5). 45
Section 523(a)(15) fits basic bankruptcy principles governing the
nondischargeability of the protected debts of section 523(a). It
conforms with the policy and equity concerns grounded in nondis-
chargeable debts. It is generally understood that the basic objective
of bankruptcy relief is to provide the deserving debtor a discharge of
all prepetition indebtedness and to allow prepetition creditors to
share equitably in the proceeds from the bankruptcy estate.
46
However, in the interest of equity and the general welfare of society
as a whole, the debtor's discharge from certain prepetition indebted-
ness is subject to exception where equity and justice make the
general principle of discharge inappropriate for the debtor and the
affected creditor.147 The prepetition obligations a debtor has to his
or her family weighs heavily against discharge because of the
important role the "family" unit plays in society and the support
system a family unit is expected to provide to its members. A critical
part of this support is the financial support of dependent children
and former spouses who emerge from a divorce financially dependent
on the financially stronger spouse. Accordingly, alimony and child
support obligations have been excepted from bankruptcy discharge
for almost two centuries.
48
14 See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing the provision's goal of eliminating
the opportunity from noncustodial parents to avoid payment of support through bankruptcy).
141 See In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102, 105-06 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996); Anthony v. Anthony (In
re Anthony), 190 B.R. 433, 436 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995).
146 See CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 144 (1935).
147 See id. (explaining that "[t]here is now ... a rather general acceptance of the principle
that a bankruptcy law is required in the public interest of the Nation at large and for its
welfare, apart from the effect of the law upon the particular individuals on whom it is to
operate").
14 See Smither, 194 B.R. at 105 (stating that since the early part of the nineteenth century
alimony and child support payments have been nondischargeable through bankruptcy).
1997] 1207
Albany Law Review
Given the importance of property settlements and hold harmless
agreements, which are increasingly common in divorce and
separation decrees, the inclusion of these familial-based obligations
fits well within the public policy concerns that 'society has in
preserving the financial support expected and required for families.
It is also important to enforce marital property divisions based on
the contributions divorcing couples made as a family and which
ultimately must be divided between them in fairness to both parties.
Moreover, under section 523(a)(15) the debtor's need for discharge
and a fresh start is taken into consideration in the determination of
nondischargeability by permitting a balancing of the debtor's need for
discharge against the nondebtor spouse's need to have the debt
excepted from discharge.'49 This is a balancing of interests be-
tween the debtor's ultimate need of a discharge and fresh start and
the financial vulnerability of an individual creditor to the debtor's
discharge.
A. The Burden of Proof
Given the fact that the goals of section 523(a)(15) conform with
and reflect the principles and concerns that dominate bankruptcy
relief, it is now necessary to determine how it can be made more
effective. On the question of how the burden of proof should be
borne between the debtor and nondebtor spouse, the majority view
taken by the courts applying section 523(a)(15) seems most ap-
propriate based on the overall goals of the provision, how well it fits
within the overall goals of bankruptcy discharge, and the structure
of the provision.
In fact, the court in Jodoin eloquently raised these points in its
support of the majority view, stating that this view should prevail
because it "provid[es] the best fit to the statutory language and
apparent policies" of the provision.' °
[Section 523(a)(15)] is best viewed as an effort to harmonize
two competing policies. The rehabilitative policy of
bankruptcy clashes with the more general federal policy of
not upsetting domestic relations decisions of state courts.
Intra-family obligations that have been established in marital
dissolutions often involve delicate noneconomic issues that
can be exacerbated by incautious application of bankruptcy relief.
'4 See Anthony, 190 B.R. at 436.
0 See Samayoa v. Jodoin (In re Jodoin), 196 B.R. 845, 853 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1996).
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Under this view, Congress accommodated the clash regarding
debts arising out of marital dissolutions with the following
regime.- Alimony and support obligations are nondischar-
geable. Other marital dissolution debts are rebuttably
presumed to be nondischargeable. If the debtor cannot afford
to pay, the presumption of nondischargeability is rebutted
and the debt discharged. If the debtor can afford to pay, the
debt is discharged only if the debtor demonstrates that the
harm to the nondebtor resulting from dishonoring the debt is
less than the benefit the debtor reaps from not having to pay.
This is a rational accommodation of the two policies.151
The court further noted that the way in which section 523(a)(15) was
drafted, subsections -(A) and (B) are presented as defenses to the
presumption of nondischargeability "rather than as substantive
elements of nondischargeability.'
15 2
The Jodoin court's focus on the language of section 523(a)(15)-the
way it fits within the basic structure of bankruptcy relief and the
competing interests that have to be considered and weighed in
determining the extent of relief that will be granted in
bankruptcy-provides the clearest interpretation of the burden of
proof offered thus far. It should be recalled that while there is a
clear majority view that the burden of proving the applicability of theprovision to the debt in question first rests with the nondebtor
spouse, and the burden of proving the elements of subsections (A)
and (B) requiring discharge rest with the debtor, there is a split
between the courts on the reasoning for this view.'53 One group
concluded that the burden of proof should be split, between the
nondebtor spouse and the debtor based on a comparative analysis of
the language of section 523(a)(15) with that of the student loan
nondischarge provision of section 523(a)(8).1 54  The other group
based its interpretation on the "plain language" of the provision. 55
Of the two minority interpretations regarding the burden of proof
under section 523(a)(15), one was very critical of the majority
"' Id. at 853-54 (citations omitted).
152 Id. at 853.
"' See supra notes 41-60 and accompanying text (explaining that some courts have made
a comparative analysis between sections 523(a)(15) and 523(a)(8) while others rely on a plain
language interpretation of the statute).
154 See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text (discussing the comparative analysis of the
provisions).




interpretation that based its interpretation on perceived similarities
between the language of section 523(a)(15) and section 523(a)(8).
15 6
The Butler court held that the entire burden of proof should fall on
the nondebtor spouse because of the dissimilarities between the two
provisions, noting that, under the language of section 523(a)(8), the
student loan is nondischargeable unless the debtor proves "undue
hardship."15' 7 In contrast, the language of section 523(a)(15)
presumes nondischarge only if the creditor meets the affirmative
requirement to file a complaint with the bankruptcy court for an
adversary hearing on nondischargeability. 58  Accordingly, it was
argued that the language of section 523(a)(15) and the requirement
that the creditor seek a court determination of nondischargeability
distinguishes the two provisions and suggests the burden of proof
rests solely on the nondebtor spouse. 5 9 Finally, the other minority
view bifurcates the burden of proving the elements under subsections
(A) and (B) governing discharge. Apparently, this view does not
regard subsections (A) and (B) as defenses for the debtor in favor of
discharge. It suggests that where the debtor has the ability to pay,
it is the creditor who has the greatest ability and motivation to
establish if the benefits of discharge outweigh the detrimental
consequences to the creditor.
1 60
Based on the variations between the courts in their interpretations
of the burden of proof, it is clear that neither the "plain language" of
the provision, nor comparison of section 523(a)(15) with section
523(a)(8) will render a completely acceptable interpretation of the
burden of proof. Thus, the better approach of analysis requires a
review of the language of the provision, the objectives of the
provision and how it fits into the overall goals of bankruptcy
discharge as adopted by the court in Jodoin.
156 See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (describing courts which emphasize the
dissimilarity between the two sections).
157 See Kessler v. Butler (In re Butler), 196 B.R. 371, 374 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995).
158 See id. (pointing out the different presumptions created by each provision).
159 See id. ("It is clear to us that the burden of proof in § 523 hearings should be upon the
objecting creditor.").
160 See id. (holding that "[t]he creditor is in the best logical position to plead the detrimental
effects of a discharge"); see also supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining the reasoning
followed by the court in Hesson).
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B. The Standard of Measuring the Ability to Pay
The courts are once again divided on the question of the standard
of measurement, or test to be applied, in assessing the debtor's
ability to pay the debt under section 523(a)(15)(A). 161  In this
instance, however, they have engaged in review of the tests used to
determine a debtor's ability to pay under section 1325(b)(2), which
applies a "disposable income test" standard in chapter 13 cases, and
the "undue hardship" test used under section 523(a)(8) to determine
whether a debtor deserves a discharge from a student loan debt.
162
Again, the courts look at the language of section 523(a)(15) to find
similarities in the language of these provisions to justify which
standard to use under subsection (A) of 523(a)(15).
163
It is the requirement under section 523(a)(15)(A) that the debtor
not have the "ability to pay" the debt for a determination of
nondischargeability that recalls the "disposable income test" used
under section 1325(b)(2).164  In a chapter 13 case, this test is
defined as requiring an analysis of the debtor's listed expenses as
reasonably necessary for support and maintenance during the term
of the chapter 13 plan.165 As noted by the courts that disagree
with the application of the disposable income test, this test is
designed to address circumstances under chapter 13, which do not
take into account a discharge of other prepetition debts, as would
occur in a chapter 7 liquidation, and is limited to the debtor's ability
to pay for a three-year period. 66 Accordingly, these courts rejected
the use of the disposable income test under section 523(a)(15)(A).
They argued that the more appropriate test is the "undue hardship"
test required under section 523(a)(8), because it requires con-
161 See supra notes 61-82 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 61-82 and accompanying text (discussing the two tests in detail).
13 Compare Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R. 750, 755 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (applying the
disposable income test) with Butler, 186 B.R. at 374-75 (discussing undue burden under section
523(a)(8)).
164 See, e.g., Hill, 184 B.R. at 755 (stating that "[tlhe use of the phrase 'ability to pay' in
Section 523(a)(15)(A) directs the Court to Section 1325(b)(2)'s 'disposable income' test").
165 See, e.g., Greenwalt v. Greenwalt (In re Greenwalt), 200 B.R. 909, 913 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 1996) ("Tihe Court must critically assess the debtor's budgeted expenses to determine
the minimum the debtor could afford to pay over a three-year period."); In re Cornelius, 195
B.R. 831, 835 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying section 1325(b)(2) analysis to conclude that
Social Security income is among the debtor's listed expenses).
" See Straub v. Straub (In re Straub), 192 B.R. 522, 528 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1996) (noting the




sideration of the effects of discharge from other prepetition debts and
is not at all restricted by the repayment period." 7
The recent decision in Jodoin synthesizes these interpretations on
the applicability of the disposable income test and the "undue
hardship" test, and suggests a standard of measurement that
borrows from both tests and identifies how that standard would best
serve the overall objectives of section 523(a)(15). 6 ' By having a
test that encompasses both standards, factors that are "purely
financial" and relevant to a debtor's reasonable expenses for support
and maintenance can be considered, along with the more "fundamen-
tally subjective" factors that often accompany a divorce and provide
critical insight into the debtor's ability to pay the debt beyond what
is listed in bankruptcy schedules.'69 Moreover, a modified test of
the two standards would not be limited by time, as is the case with
the disposable income test and its application in chapter 13
cases.
70
C. Time of Inquiry as to Ability to Pay
Related to this interpretive question regarding section
523(a)(15)(A) and the determination of the debtor's ability to pay the
debt is what time periods are relevant to this inquiry. A very small
minority of decisions suggested that the court should look at the time
the complaint for a determination of nondischargeability is filed, 7'
or the date the bankruptcy petition was filed.172  The majority of
the courts suggest that the time period of review should at least
begin with the ability of the debtor to pay at the time of the trial for.
the determination of nondischargeability, rejecting specific periods
prior to the trial or a limited "snapshot" inquiry. 17' This takes into
account any changes in the debtor's circumstances that would have
167 See id. (stating that under section 523(a)(8), "[clourts look to a debtor's long-term
financial prospects and seek to determine whether a debtor's present financial inability to pay
a student loan will exist on into the foreseeable future").
16 See Samayoa v. Jodoin (In re Jodoin), 196 B.R. 845, 855 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1996)
(concluding that the test "gives the court the flexibility to do justice").
169 See id. at 854-55.
170 See id. at 854 (stating that the modified test considers disposable income "with an
indefinite horizon in mind").
171 See Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R. 750, 754 (Bankr N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that the
date of filing is the appropriate point of inquiry).
172 See Carroll v. Carroll (In re Carroll), 187 B.R. 197, 200 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995).
17 See, e.g., Jodoin, 196 B.R. at 854 (measuring the ability to pay from time of trial).
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an effect on the debtor's current and future ability to pay the
debt.'74 This view seems to make the most sense, given the fact
that the provision is concerned about payment of the obligation after
bankruptcy, which is the consequence of nondischargeability.
D. Partial Discharge
Another question that has arisen in the application of section
523(a)(15) is whether a partial discharge is permitted where there is
evidence of an ability to pay some of the debt. Few courts have
addressed this issue, however, among the courts that have, there is
no clear majority on whether the determination under section
523(a)(15) allows for a partial discharge or demands an "all or
nothing" determination.'75 The arguments in favor of partial
discharge are centered on comparisons between section 523(a)(15)
and section 523(a)(8), where many courts have permitted partial
discharges of student loans. 7 6 It is viewed as being "fair and
equitable" to hold the debtor responsible for the debt to the extent it
can be paid, while at the same time acknowledging the need to have
equitable modifications of the terms of these obligations to make
determinations of partial discharge.'77 Other courts reject using
comparisons between section 523(a)(15) and section 523(a)(8). 7 '
They note that there is nothing in the language of section 523(a)(15)
to suggest partial discharge.'79 Moreover, the challenge of deter-
mining the ability to pay an entire debt, let alone a portion of the
debt, raises caution against determinations that will "nickel and
dime" the debtor.' It should be noted, however, that a "nickel
and dime" effect of nondischarge can occur in partial discharge cases
174 See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text (addressing the different time periods
utilized by the courts in determining the debtor's ability to pay).
17 See Comisky v. Comisky (In re Comisky), 183 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995)
(calling the "all or nothing" result "harsh" and not mandated by the Code).
176 See id. ("[T]he court finds analogous cases regarding student loan issues to be helpful in
deciding this case.").
... See supra notes 93-105 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning behind equitable
modifications).
'78 See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text (discussing cases that applied the "all or
nothing" test).
' See Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 191 B.R. 760, 766 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996), affd, 199
B.R. 37 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("The statute makes no provisions for determining that a part of a debt
may be found dischargeable.").
' See Collins v. Florez (In re Florez), 191 B.R. 112, 116 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (stating that




as well as in cases where the court has found some ability to pay but
adopts the "all or nothing" approach to discharge. This possible
result should remind the courts that one of the principle objectives
of bankruptcy relief is to provide a deserving debtor a "fresh
start."'
8
Accordingly, the partial discharge of the debt under section
523(a)(15) should not be prohibited where the court finds it fair and
equitable. The survival of the debt after bankruptcy will not impair
the debtor's ability to achieve a fresh start and the nondebtor
spouse's need for some payment overrides the debtor's need for a
discharge. Such a result clearly would be in accord with the
objectives of section 523(a)(15) and the overall goals of bankruptcy
relief. The question and determination of partial discharge seems
appropriate under the equitable umbrella of bankruptcy and should
be left to the courts' discretion.
E. Balancing the Benefit and Detriment of Discharge
The final question the courts have wrestled with in interpreting
and applying section 523(a)(15)(B) is what factors to consider in
balancing the consequences of discharge or nondischarge between the
debtor and nondebtor spouse. This question is not the subject of
great division, but more of a call for guidance. This guidance has
been well fashioned by the courts through case law that has amassed
on this question." 2 It has been uniformly accepted by the courts
that the "totality of the circumstances" that will affect the financial
lives of the debtor and nondebtor spouse must be considered when
determining if, and the extent to which, the benefits of discharge to
the debtor outweigh the detrimental consequences of discharge to the
nondebtor spouse.8 3 What factors the courts will deem relevant
to this exercise and how they will balance them will inevitably vary
from court to court simply because the factors will vary from case to
... See id. ("The concept of a fresh start is amply challenged by application of Section
523(a)(15)(A).").
132 See supra note 112 and accompanying text (listing cases deciding on totality of
circumstances test).
... See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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case." 4 This task will undoubtedly reflect the value judgments of
each court.
F The Legislative Solution
In view of the forgoing analysis, it appears that the legislative
redemption of section 523(a)(15) can accommodate a statutory
clarification of three of the issues discussed above. The first of which
is to adopt the majority view of how to apply the burden of proof.
This is, that it is the nondebtor spouse's burden to prove that the
debt in question qualifies as a nonsupport divorce-based obligation,
and is thus presumptively nondischargeable. It is the debtor's
burden to rebut this presumption by proving the debtor's inability to
pay the debt, or in the alternative, that the benefit of discharge
outweighs the detrimental consequences of discharge to the nondebt-
or spouse. The second issue for legislative clarification is whether
the time of inquiry into the debtor's financial stability must be broad,
thereby permitting an assessment of the debtor's present and future
ability to pay the debt. Lastly, it should be clarified that the
standard of measuring the debtor's ability to pay similarly must be
broad and permit both a quantitative assessment of the ability to pay
as well as a subjective assessment of the ability to pay. This may be
accomplished through an "explicit good faith" test as suggested by
the court in Jodoin.'8' The issues governing partial discharge and
the factors to be considered in balancing the consequences of
discharge between the debtor and the nondebtor spouse should be
left to the discretion of the courts as they apply this provision to the
unique factors of each case in accordance with basic bankruptcy
principles.
Accordingly, an amended section 523(a)(15) reflecting these
clarifications would prohibit a debtor from discharge of any debt that
is:
Not of the kind described in paragraph (5) that is incurred by
the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or in
connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or
other order of a court of record, a determination made in
i Compare Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R. 750, 756 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (balancing
budgets, lifestyles and incomes) with Greenwalt v. Greenwalt (In re Greenwalt), 200 B.R. 909,
914-15 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1996) (balancing income, expenses, ability to pay debt and nature
of debt).
' See Samayoa v. Jodoin (In re Jodoin), 196 B.R. 845, 854-55 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1996).
19971 1215
Albany Law Review
accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental
unit unless the debtor proves in good faith that he or she-
(A) the debtere does not have the present and future ability
to pay such debt from income or property of the debtor not
reasonably necessary to be expended for the maintenance
or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor and,
if the debtor is engaged in a business, for the payment of
expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation,
and operation of such business; or
(B) discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the
debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to a
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor.'
There are undoubtedly many ways that section 523(a)(15) can be
analyzed, criticized and improved. However, it is unsettling to
realize this provision's significance in our society. Sadly, it is a
necessary piece of legislation due to divorce's devastating consequen-
ces and its consistent frequency.
186 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (1994) (with author's deletions and additions).
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